Essay in labor economics: children immigration, informal employment, and social mobility in Mexico by García Andrés, Adelaido
 UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE NUEVO LEÓN 
FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA  
DIVISION DE ESTUDIOS DE POSGRADO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“ESSAYS IN LABOR ECONOMICS: CHILDREN 
IMMIGRATION, INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT, AND 
SOCIAL MOBILITY IN MEXICO” 
 
 
Por  
 
ADELAIDO GARCÍA ANDRÉS  
 
Tesis presentada como requisito parcial para 
obtener el grado de Doctorado en Ciencias Económicas   
 
 
 
 
JUNIO 2016 
 
  
ABSTRACT
My thesis dissertation consists of three empirical essays on labor economics:
Chapter 1. “How does affect household immigration child labor?” focus
in a little explored area in Mexico, the effect of household immigration on child
labor. Using the 2013 MTI-ENOE, I set up a bivariate probit model to control
two mixed effects, the inverse relation between child labor and education, and the
endogeneity in the family migration. I find that the probability of child labor to
immigrant child is higher compared to a non migrant child, this probability
increases with his age and it is larger for boy relative to girls. In relation to
household composition, the rates of child labor is higher in household with a
father absent. In fact, immigrant children are a vulnerable group, even if they
seem to have a higher level of education than non-migrant.
Chapter 2. “Intergenerational transmission of informal employment in
Mexico. A limited choice or better income prospects?” motivates the use
of retrospective data 2011 ESRU Survey of Social Mobility in Mexico. I develop a
formal/informal employment occupation model to estimate the likelihood for sons
to continue the same father’s employment occupation sector. Different from the
previous evidence in Mexico, my study differs in three ways: (1) empirical strategy
aims at controlling as much as possible for heterogeneity sample, (2)
microeconometric framework derives from a structural model with expected wages
explicitly determining labor occupation decisions, (3) selectivity bias is achieved
using a two-steep estimation. My results show a strong connection between
intergenerational occupation, also predicted earnings differentials between
occupation sectors. Hence, individuals with informal parent’s occupation have less
likelihood to be enrolled in the formal sector.
Chapter 3. “Leaving the nest or living with her parents: Evidence from
Mexican millennia’s generation” adds to the literature by examining the
determinants of children’s propensity to live with their parents. The 2010 Mexican
Census enumerated that 67 percent young adults aged 20 to 29 years still living
with their parents, 29 percent living with a partner and about 4 percent living
alone. Why young adults co-residence with her parents beyond mature age has
several issue. i.e., living with parent’s serves as an important mechanism through
with parents transfer resources to their adult’s sons.
I focus on Millennia’s Generation (1980–1999) in order to consider some relevant
characteristics’ in this generation. I found that labor participation reduce the
propensity to co residence only for males, this is explained in part by lower labor
participation for female sample, however, this results should be considered with
caution due to endogeneity between labor participation and co residence. Similar
to other papers, I  found that children living in household where both parents are
working may experience low unemployment rates, which is associated with
independence of children at younger age.
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1Chapter 1. How does affect household immigration
child labor? Evidence from Mexico
How does affect household immigration child
labor? Evidence from Mexico
1.1 Introduction
This paper focus on a little explored area, the effect of migration on child labor, in
other words, we would like to test whether immigrant children have a larger
propensity to work compared with those non–migrant children.
The International Labor Organization (ILO henceforth) mentions that 1 in 8
persons is migrant around the world, from which a third of the migrant flow from
developing countries are young people, aged 12 to 24 year. According to the 2011
Mexican National Survey of Demographics Dynamics (ENADID, for its acronym
in Spanish) 16 out of 100 people reside in a different location to its birthplace.
Mexican Population Census statistics show a decrease in the immigration rates
from 3.8 percent to 2.9 percent between 2000 and 2010, for children aged 5 to 17
years, our objective sample.1
Usually, most children migrate with their families, so then migration is a survival
solution for households in need, because it provides them new opportunities to
families and their children Glind (2010). Also, migration decision is influenced by
several factors, such as a conflict and natural disasters, domestic violence, family
structure, family income, and search for better opportunities. Hence, migration
can provide a positive experience by providing them with a better life, increase job
opportunities, escape from immediate threats such as forced marriage, and have
access to school or to a better school Hashim (2005). Also, migration might
provide an opportunity to run away social order divisions to work with dignity
and freedom at the destination Deshingkar and Akter (2009).
1 http://www.ilo.org/ipec/areas/Migration_and_CL/lang--en/index.htm
2However, children migrants could face serious challenges in their destinations, e.g.
Powers (2011) suggests that a change in household membership changes the
overall household workload of both home production and market work.
Additionally, empirical studies suggest that migration makes children increasingly
vulnerable to child labor, usually because they enroll in the worst forms of child
labor with low wages and long working hours, Immink and Payongayong (1999),
Edmonds and Shrestha (2013). As Coffey (2013) points out, if parents do not
know about this disadvantage, or they do not consider it when deciding whether
or not to take their children with them when they migrate, then it constitutes a
negative externality of immigration.
This paper examines the empirical evidence linking migration children with child
labor using 2013 Child Labor Module (MTI for its acronym in Spanish). Similar to
Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) we assume that the migration and child labor
choices are made in the child’s current household. Hence, we divide the sample in
two main groups, a) children living in nuclear households –whether both parents
are present and whether one is absent–, and b) children living in non-nuclear
household.
In this paper we focus on the migrant children and how migration affects
children’s development. Migration can have positive or negative effects. Migration
depends on family composition; the absence of a male role model might have a
detrimental effect on boys, while the demonstration effect of migration might
cause some children to reduce their effort in school, because they anticipate
migrating for low-skilled work in the future Powers (2011).
Empirical strategy must consider two mixed effects on the child labor decision.
First, the inverse correlation between child labor and education time Bhalotra and
Tzannatos (2003), and second, the endogeneity in the migration process, i.e., the
emigrant population is not randomly selected, composed by individuals who have
particular sets of skills and attributes Borjas (1999).
Our paper will model these two decisions with a setup of a Bivariate Probit model
composed by two binary dependent variables for the outcome (Child Labor) and a
selection equation (Migrant Child). Hence, we estimate child labor and migration
determinants in the outcome equation and migration decision separately. We
3account for unobserved factors affecting both equations, and then, an error
bivariate distribution will be estimated to account for the endogeneity effect.2
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of
literature about children in migration. Section 3 presents descriptive statistics
about children in the dataset to provide context. Section 4 introduces the
empirical model and presents the results. And finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 A Bivariate Probit model has been used by Canagarajah & Coulombe (1997), and
Nielsen (1998) to estimating the schooling and working decision jointly.
41.2. Literature review
Theory of migration derives from neo-classical economics that suggests that
migration is the result of household or individual decisions made by rational
agents who seek to improve their well-being. This choice will be inducement by
utility maximization, factor mobility, and wage differentials. However, migrants
do not constitute a homogeneous category; migrants could be segmented along
gender, class, ethnicity, language and religion. Woman and children remain among
the most invisible and vulnerable groups among migrants UNESCO and UNICEF
(2012).
As CPI (2013) suggests “children on the move” is an umbrella definition that
brings together a wide range of motives. Following Van de Glind (2010) we can
distinguish three categories of voluntary migration as follow: 1) children who
migrate with their parents (i.e. family moves together), 2) independent child
migrants, and 3) children left–behind by migrant parents (i.e. migration for one or
both parents).3
Regarding to other categories, it includes children who have been trafficked,
children who migrate and children displaced by conflict and natural disasters,
domestic violence, child fostering, learning experience, family’s survival strategy,
and others Van de Glind (2010). Some of the children are at risk to have their
rights violated, especially those exploited on child labor IPEC (2012).
Also, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) suggest that migration makes children
increasingly vulnerable to child labor. It has been argued that children from larger
households are more likely to work, because fewer resources have to be assigned
among more household members. Another negative effect can be observed in
educational outcomes, e.g. in some cases migrant students are forced to repeat the
same grade, regardless of their age or learning needs, due to inflexible school
procedures and the absence of remedial classes that address students’ learning
deficits  UNESCO (2013), or due to missing weeks or months of the school year to
3 Independent child migrant may also be a part of a family’s survival strategy as the
migration of a child decrease the dependency ratio in the household, even when the child
does not earn enough to wave. In addition, some children are able to save and send
remittances, sometimes contributing to the education of their siblings (Van de Glind,
2010 p. 7).
5accompany their parents to the destination site when the migration cycles begin
Coffey (2013).
There are several plausible mechanisms that could lead from child migration to
poor outcomes. Migration may lead children to forget what they have learned in
school, or prevent them from developing relationships with teacher and classmates
that help them progress through school. Upon returning to their home villages,
migrant children face multiple difficulties. For example, migrant children
experience learning difficulties that results from attendance disruptions Gindling
and Poggio (2010).
In the case of Mexico, previous studies have examined the effects of migration of
parents, Antman (2010) explores the short–run effects of a father’s U.S.
migrations on his children’s schooling and child labor. Their results suggest of
children decreasing their study hours and participation in schooling in response to
a father’s absence, especially for younger children. While for sons aged 12-15 years
increase their works hours and child labor participation outside the home.
In addition, McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) find that a household having a
migrant member lower the chances to both boys and girls of completing high
school, also increases their probability of entering the labor force. With respect to
children in migrant households, Hanson and Woodruuf (2003) show that children
will significantly complete fewer years of schooling. In addition, they find that the
migrant from the household is correlated with more schooling for children with
mother with lower education level.
Opposite this results, Malone (2007) finds that a father’s absence due to migration
is likely to have a positive effect on children’s schooling, as a result of remittances,
mother’s are more likely to see education as one of the primary uses of extra
income from abroad. Improvements in child’s educational attainment may
therefore be more likely to occur when the fathers migrates, leaving the use of
remittances and determination of resources for mothers.
61.3. Data
1.3.1 Child labor module MTI–ENOE
The used data come from 2013 Child Labor Module (MTI, for its acronym in
Spanish). MTI is collected in the fourth quarter as an appendix to 2013 National
Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE, for its acronym in Spanish).
Child Labor Module (MTI–ENOE henceforth) is conducted by INEGI to measure
Mexico’s labor force and its employment characteristics. Each sample household is
interviewed five times at three-month intervals and the sample is divided into five
roughly equal rotation groups.
The MTI–ENOE complements normally collected information for the population
aged 12 to 17 years in the ENOE basic questionnaire and extends its analysis to
include features related to labor market participation and schooling for children
aged 5 to 11 years. The 2013 ENOE’s fourth trimester sample of contains a total
sample of 121,116 households. MTI–ENOE is a complete survey to identify the
factors that determine child labor participation and schooling attendance. The
questions are asked only to one child in every household. Because the MTI–ENOE
is applied in households with full interview where children aged 5-17 years are
living, the objective sample is 95,634 children.4
1.3.2 Children immigration using MTI–ENOE
The National Survey of Demographic Dynamics (ENADID) is a national
household survey to collect a wide range of information about population change
in Mexico. ENADID collects the same information as the 2010 census: age at
migration, state of origin for the migrant, month and year of departure, current
residence, and, if the international migrant is back to Mexico, return date to
Mexico. ENADID asked residence over the five years previous to the survey, while
Census additionally asks residence on the previous year. However, ENADID and
Mexican Population Census do not include detailed information about a labor
force and its employment characteristics for children population.
4 The 2013 MTI was designed by an inter-institutional working team of technicians, led
by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare and the National Institute of Statistics and
Geography, with advice from the ILO and UNICEF
7Compared to ENADID and Mexican Population Census, ENOE is limited to
identify migration movements. ENOE does not collect information on previous
residence, but we can measure only movements into and out the existing
households.
ENOE let us identify new arriving families in the surveyed households. To
measure children in immigration is used the question of residency status that
refers to the previous year of the survey. There are three possible values: if the
value that stores this field is 1, the child is an habitual resident; if the value is 2,
he is a definitive absent; and if the value is 3, he is a new resident. So, we define
immigrant children as the cases where he is a new resident.
Given the limitations of the databases to jointly measure child labor and
migration, in this paper we will use ENOE data. Then to verify the validity of our
measurement, we calculate rates of immigration per state comparing information
from ENOE and Mexican Population Census, because both are analogous in terms
of the previous residence one year before the survey; although each refers to the
immigration movements in 2012 and 2009 respectively.
Graph 1 shows the comparison between both sources of information. Quintana
Roo and Baja California Norte are the states that host the largest percentage of
immigrants while Queretaro has the lowest immigrant rate; facts that can be
identified from both datasets. Eight states differ by 0.1 or 0.2 percentage points
(pp), while the rest differs in no more than 1.5 pp. Even though, temporal
comparison between datasets is not the same year. ENOE seems a good
approximation to the measure immigration rates among states because the
absolute differences are relatively small.
8Graph 1. Children immigration  statistics in Mexico
Note: Percentage of immigrant children aged 5-17
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2013 MTI–ENOE, and 2010 Census
Source: Author’s calculation based 2010 Census, 2013 MTI–ENOE
From now on we are referring only to the information obtained from MTI-ENOE
dataset. ENOE obtains the information from 29,302,018 households, from which
361,568 are immigrant households, and represent 1.23% of the total households.
The immigration movement is basically within the same state, intrastate 85.5%,
while 14.5% corresponds to families that arrived from a different state in Mexico,
defined as interstate immigration.
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This pattern is also estimated with the ENADID dataset.5 Graph 2 shows that
Quintana Roo, Baja California Norte, Guerrero, Nuevo Leon, and Nayarit are the
states with the largest intrastate immigration ranging from 2.7% to 3.7%.
Quintana Roo and Guerrero have as the principal activity of the tourism, as well
as, Baja California Norte and Nayarit but also these states have an industrial
development; Nuevo Leon is one of the principal industrial states in the country.
Other states such as Coahuila, Sinaloa, Baja California Sur, and Tabasco have
high rates of intrastate immigration from 2.9% to 3.1%. Colima, Baja California
Norte, Durango, and Quintana Roo show large rates of interstate immigration,
1.3%, 1%, 0.8% and 0.8%, respectively.
Graph 2. Children immigration by origin
Source: Author’s calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE
5 According to the 2011 ENADID, one in three children under 15 years recorded change
in the place of residence; 92.3%, 6.4% and 1.3% represents, intrastate, interstate, and
international immigration, respectively.
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There are several reasons for the families to migrate, we observe that there are
states that attract people because of the tourism, industry development and other
economic activity that generate high value added. Besides the state’s environment
there are family reasons to migrate which depend on the family structure. A
nuclear family is composed by father, mother and children. In some nuclear could
be absent one of the parents, or could have no children in the household; the
relevant condition is that if the family moves they will go together and share the
same household, in our sample represent 24.05% of the immigrant households.
Also there are families composed, besides the nuclear family, by other relatives
such as families of the siblings and parents of the head of the family or spouse,
they formed extended families, representing 75.67% of the immigrant households.
In this case, we can infer that children migrate with or without the family but
stay with relatives. The rest 0.31% are children immigrants that arrived to non-
relatives households.
Table 1 shows the main reasons that children in immigrant households answered.
One of the reasons is to meet the family and other reasons. It is surprising that a
low percentage declares job and to study reasons. Although, it is evident that
these percentages are larger when they arrived to extend families 1.86% and 5.70%
respectively, and when they arrive to non-relatives family is 8.63% for job and
6.92% for study reasons.  Even though children may not reveal that the reason to
migrate is to work or to study; the fact is that some of them are working. The
MTI–ENOE allows us not only counting them but also analyzing their labor
conditions.
Using the MTI–ENOE questionnaire and the international convention, the
definition of a child worker is a person aged from 5 to 17 years who responded to
be performing any economic activity or have plans to do, in the previous week of
the interview. The economic activity is the production for individual consumption
or any other action intending to produce or provide goods and services to the
market. These activities may be paid or unpaid. The calculation does not include
child workers who engage in activities that form part of survival strategies in poor
families, such as: looking after cars parked in the street; cleaning windshields at
traffic lights; singing in public transport or other types of street entertainment.6
6 This information is unavailable due to MTI–ENOE only covers households.
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Table 1. Reasons for children’s immigration
Reasons Household composition Total
Nuclear Extended Non-relatives
Job 0.58 % 1.86 % 8.63 % 1.57 %
Study 2.32 % 5.70 % 6.92 % 4.89 %
Married 2.74 % 6.71 % - 5.74 %
Divorce 0.91 % 0.36 % - 0.49 %
Health problems - 0.07 % - 0.05 %
Meet with family 56.39 % 52.65 % 84.44 %- 53.65 %
Insecurity 0.12 % 0.04 % - 0.06 %
Other 36.93 % 32.61 % - 33.55 %
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Immigrant families 87,127 274,441 1,112 362,680
Note: Sampling weights used to compute the children population
Source: Author’s calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE
Table 2 shows the percentage of children who are working due to their migratory
status. It is clear that the majority of households are non–migrant, 98.77%. We
calculated that the percentage of worker children differs between non-migrant and
immigrant by 3.41 percent (91.40% compared to 87.96 %). Data show a larger
percentage of children workers in immigrant households, 12.01%, and in non-
migrant households are 8.60%. Total children working rate are 8.65% independent
on the migration status.
Table 2. Child labor by migration status
Non-migrant Immigrant Total
Non-worker 91.40 % 87.96 % 91.35 %
Worker 8.60 % 12.01 % 8.65 %
Total percentage 100 % 100 % 100 %
Total households 28,974,940 362,680 29,337,620
Note: Sampling weights used to compute the children population
Source: Author’s calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE
12
Not only is the working status of the children in the immigrant households
relevant, but also the number of hours that they work per week, earnings,
education and the reasons to be working instead of studying. Table 3 shows the
number of hours worked per week. It is evident that a large proportion of non-
migrant children work less than 24 hours per week, about 27.80% work less than
15 hours and 15.95% work between 15 to 24 hours per week, for immigrant
children these percentages are 11.12% and 12.40% respectively.
The pattern changes as the weekly working hours increase, since children
immigrant work longer hours, 9.17% work between 25 to 34 hours compared to
6.80% of non-migrant children. The fact that immigrant children work the longest
is showed when we compare the percentage of children that work more than 35
hours per week, because the percentage is two times the percentage of non-
migrant children.
Table 3. Worked hours per week by migration status
Working hours Non-migrant Immigrant Total
Less than 15 hrs 27.80 % 11.12 % 27.51 %
15 to 24 hrs 15.95 % 12.40 % 15.89 %
25 to 34 hrs 6.80 % 9.17 % 6.84 %
35 or more hrs 28.76 % 58.14 % 29.27 %
Irregular 19.75 % 6.61 % 19.52 %
Unknown 0.94 % 2.56 % 0.97 %
Total 100 % 100 % 100 %
Children 5-17 years old 2,493,017 43,676 2,536,693
Note: Sampling weights used to compute the children population
Source: Author’s calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE
For comparison reason it is shown the distribution of weekly working hours for
non-migrant and immigrant children. Because it is our interest to know if the
children receive a payment for their work that could give us a hint of why
immigrant work longer hours than non-migrant, Graph 3 shows a comparison
between non-migrant and immigrant children by monetary and non-monetary
payment.
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Graph 3. Worked hours per week by migration status
S Source: Author’s calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE
We observe an interesting pattern; immigrant children work longer hours to
receive a payment while non-migrant children work fewer hours per week for a
payment. Also we can notice that a larger percentage of non-migrant children
work fewer hours and mainly do not get a monetary payment. This fact may
indicate that children may work for a family business. The gap between the longer
worked hours per week between immigrants and non-migrants is reduced if the
children do not receive a monetary payment.
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In relation to the children’s earnings in Table 4, we observe that there is no
difference between the percentages of non-migrant and immigrant children that
receive less than 1 minimum wage (mw). However, we can observe that larger
percentages of immigrant children receive more than 1 to 3 mw. This is related to
the longer hours worked per week relative to non-migrant children. On the
contrary, the non-monetary payment percentage is almost two times larger for
non-migrant children, 46.40% versus 19.00% reported by immigrant children.
Table 4. Children’s earnings by migration status
Minimum Wage (mw) Non-migrant Immigrant Total
Less than 1 mw 28.38 % 28.11 % 28.38 %
1 to 2 mw 17.01 % 31.21 % 17.25 %
2 to 3 mw 5.29 % 14.06 % 5.44 %
More than 3 mw 1.14 % 6.36 % 1.23 %
Non monetary payment 46.40 % 19.00 % 45.93 %
Unknown 1.77 % 1.27 % 1.77 %
Total 100 % 100 % 100 %
Children 5-17 years old 2,493,017 43,676 2,536,693
Note: Calculated using the expansion factors.
Source: Author’s calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE
From previous tables we have seen that the main reason for children to work is to
get a monetary payment. Table 5 shows that if a child is immigrant one of the
reasons to work is because the household needs extra income, 12.10% compared to
non-migrant children, 8.61%. However, the main reason to work, when the child is
immigrant, is because he needs to finance his own expenditures, 38.96%, also it is
for the non-migrant children workers but lower in magnitude, 22.98%. This fact
confirms that migrant children workers appear vulnerable if the house to which
they move becomes unable to maintain their costs. If the household needs
workers, perhaps for family business, then a larger percentage of children respond
it as one of the reasons to work, 22.55%; similar percentage is responded if they
like to help in the household, 22.49%. For immigrant children workers these
percentages are smaller, 18.49% and 14.61%, respectively.
15
Table 5. Children’s reasons to work by migration status
Reasons to work Non-migrant Immigrant Total
Household needs income 8.61 % 12.10 % 8.67 %
Household needs workers 22.55 % 18.49 % 22.48 %
Learn and trade 13.59 % 6.46 % 13.47 %
Own expenditure 22.98 % 38.96 % 23.25 %
Like to help 22.49 % 14.61 % 22.35 %
Other 9.78 % 9.40 % 9.78 %
Total 100 % 100 % 100 %
Children 5-17 years old 2,493,017 43,676 2,536,693
Note: Calculated using the expansion factors.
Source: Author’s calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE
Education could be one of the reasons for children to move to another city. It was
not one of the main reasons reported moving tough. Table 6 confirms that a
larger percentage of the immigrant children are not attending school, 19.93%,
compared to non-migrant children who show a lower percentage, 7.07%.
Nevertheless, the majority of children would be attending the school, non-migrant
92.93% and immigrant children, 80.07%.
Table 6. School attendance by migration status
Attending to school Non-migrant Immigrant Total
No 7.07 19.93 7.23
Yes 92.93 80.07 92.77
Total 100 % 100 % 100 %
Total Households 28,974,940 362,680 29,337,620
Note: Calculated using the expansion factors.
Source: Author’s calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE
Previous table does not tell much about the education level that children are
attending. Table 7 shows the attained level of education of the children by their
migration status. Children face a larger opportunity cost of studying as they get
older, so then it is likely that migrant children would have at least some level of
education, and then migrate to work. The self-selection of migrant is related to
the education level of the migrants; those who are more able would be more likely
to migrate.
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From the data we can infer that non-migrant children are more concentrated on
the lower levels of incomplete attained education, such as no schooling years,
partial primary and partial secondary relative to immigrant children. On the
contrary, larger percentages of immigrant children have attained complete
primary, secondary and high school or more. Therefore, immigrant children seem
to have higher education than non-migrant children.
Table 7. Educational attainment by migration status
Education level Non-migrant Immigrant Total
Non schooling 18.88 % 16.77 % 18.86 %
Partial primary 42.15 % 37.72 % 42.09 %
Completed primary 9.75 % 10.28 % 9.76 %
Partial secondary 15.07 % 13.46 % 15.05 %
Completed secondary 8.36 % 14.68 % 8.43 %
High school or more 5.77 % 7.09 % 5.78 %
Total 100 % 100 % 100 %
Children 5-17 years old 2,493,017 43,676 2,536,693
Note: Calculated using the expansion factors, exclude 0.02% matching to Unknown
category.
Source: Author’s calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE
According to the evidence presented migration does not necessarily is accompanied
with high school attendance. In fact, there are two trends of school dropout
percentages, see Graph 4. The first trend, defined for children who are 6 to 11
years old, reveals that non-migrant children have the highest dropout rates. The
second trend, for children who are 12 years old or more, the dropout rates are
larger for immigrant children.
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Graph 4. Age stopped school attendance
Note: Only include children currently not attending to school.
Source: Author’s calculation based 2013 MTI–ENOE
It is remarkable that the highest dropout school rate is at 15 years old and is
larger for immigrant children, 42.8%, compared to 31.8% of non-migrant. In this
sense, the immigrant children are more vulnerable, most of all, if they are
teenagers.
Although compulsory education in Mexico is until secondary, the dropout
attendance rates are higher in this level SEP (2013). This pattern could be
explained because the eldest children became more productive and therefore the
opportunity cost to keep them in the school it increases UCW (2012).
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1.4. Empirical strategy
1.4.1 Identification
It is assumed that the heads of the family. Mother and father, would decide what
is best for the family to improve their income and living conditions. Then child
labor and migration are two decisions that children cannot make by themselves.
Family would choose whether to send the children to school, to work, or both, and
whether to move to another city to improve the family income.7
The migration process involves different factors that may result in higher child
labor, although the opposite is also expected if the purpose of moving is for
getting higher education. Family income is relevant to determine how child labor
and migration are related. On one hand, if a family has restrictions for moving to
another city to get better job conditions and higher wages, it would be likely that
children would be sent to work. On the other hand, a family may decide moving
to another city but this change creates imbalances on the family’s income that
makes them send their children to work instead to the school. Also a family may
move not only to increase family income but to get schooling opportunities for
their children. Then the association between migration and child labor could be in
both directions.
The question to be answered is whether migrant families, and therefore, migrant
children are more likely to work. This paper will try to model these two decisions
as independent, however, there are unobserved factors affecting both child labor
and migration decisions. For example, father, mother and children’s ability,
attitude toward improving opportunities, preference to study in better quality
schools, and the like.
Endogeneity of the migration process, including the fact that migrant households
and members self–selection into this status on the basis of both observed and
unobserved characteristics, complicates identification of the causal effect of
migration on child development. The empirical strategy to deal with child labor
7 Van de Glind (2010) stated that children during the migration process are exposed to
high risk of violence, abuse and worst forms of child labor, especially if they migrate
without the family. However, the available information cannot let us analyze this type of
children migration, instead using ENOE will let us to analyze closely child labor
conditional to the migration status of the family.
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and migration to account for the endogeneity is to estimate child labor and
migration determinants separately but considering that there are unobserved
factors affecting both equations, and then an error bivariate distribution will be
estimated to account for the endogeneity effect.
1.4.2 Recursive bivariate probit model
The difference between univariate and bivariate Probit is the potential nonzero
correlation (ρ≠0) between the unobserved explanatory factors in the two
equations. Estimating both equations as a system will not affect the consistency of
individual Probit estimates. More details about the Recursive Bivariate Probit
model see: Maddala and Lee (1976), Greene (1998).
The estimated model is composed by two binary dependent variables for the
outcome and selection equations. The outcome equation has as dependent
variable, Y1, representing the Child Labor variable that takes the value of 1 and 0
otherwise; and the selection equation has also a binary dependent variable, Y2, if
the individual is a Migrant Child takes the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. Hence, the
latent variable ∗ represents the decision of child labor and the latent ∗
represents the decision to migrate.
The set up for the model is as follows:
YY 1211
'
1
*
1 iiii   xβ (1)
otherwise0,0Y1Y *i1i1  if
Y 22
'
2
*
2 iii  xβ (2)
otherwise0,0Y1Y *i2i2  if
0),(),( 212211  xxxx ii εEεE
1),(),( 212211  xxxx ii εVarεVar
n1,2,3,...,i;),,( 2121  ρεεCov ii xx
The model accounts for the effect that migration has on child labor, since y i2 is
also included in the first equation as an endogenous variable. This is a recursive,
simultaneous bivariate probit model, where Xi1 and Xi2 are row vectors of
exogenous variables which determine respectively, Child Labor and Migrant Child
propensities, and (β1) and (β2) are associated parameter column vectors.
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The vectors xi1 and xi2 represent the set of independent observable variables that
are affecting both decisions to work and to migrate. For identification purposes,
we need at least one different independent variable in the selection equation. This
two-step procedure represents an attempt to deal with the simultaneity problem
Greene (1998).
Another important variable is the effect of children school attendance on migrant
household decision. In equation (2) school attendance has an effect on the decision
to migrate; for example, family can send the children outside or migrate together
to have access to school or to a better school Hashim (2005), or, parents who care
more strongly about education of their children may migrate in order to earn
income that can be used to pay for schooling expenses McKenzie and Rapoport,
(2011). Since most data sets describe an inverse correlation between child labor
and schooling attendance at the micro-level Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003), we do
not include school attendance in the outcome equation.
Family composition has important implications, for example, the absence of a
male role model might have a detrimental effect on boys, while the demonstration
effect of migration might cause some children to reduce their effort in school,
because they anticipate migrating for low-skilled work in the future Powers
(2011). Since child labor and migration decisions are both made in the child’s
current household, we divide the sample in two groups, a) children living in
nuclear household –whether both parents are present and whether one can be
absent–, and b) children living in extended families, non-nuclear household.
Table A1 describes the variables in the model; the dependents variables are the
choices to send a child to work and the household migration decision, and the
independent variables are the child’s age, gender, household’s size, household’s
composition, household’s head completed grades in school, locality size and
regions. And Table A2 presents a summary statistics for the dependent and
independent variables used the regression analysis. It also summarizes some of the
other descriptive statistics that have been used to contextualize the main results.
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1.4.3 Results
Tables 8 and 9 show the marginal effects on the probability that children –aged
12 and 17 years old– work conditional to their migration status and other
independent variables. Table 8 shows the marginal effect applying a simple
Probit model, while Table 9 shows the conditional marginal effect between child
labor and migration accounting for the endogeneity effect explained in Section
1.4.2.
Results providing evidence that family structure is important not only on the
decision to migrate but also the decision to work. The coefficient that relates child
labor and migration is positive in the models presented without controlling for
endogeneity, models (1)–(4) in Table 8, and also when controlling for
endogeneity, models (5)–(8) in Table 9. Comparing the whole sample, the
probability that a child works is estimated at 1.05%, if he is immigrant; while the
coefficient when we control for endogeneity effect became larger, 5.16%.
The coefficient of a nuclear family, relative to extended families, is negative
indicating that it is a factor that may reduce child labor, although it is not
statistically significant when considering the whole sample. Therefore, we divide
the sample in nuclear families to incorporate three possibilities: parents present in
the household, father is absent, and mother is absent in the nuclear household.
Results show that the probability that a child works –given that he is an
immigrant– is positive and larger. In fact, if parents are present in the nuclear
family, model (2), the probability of child labor and immigration is 2.42% while
controlling for endogeneity is even larger, 7.48%, model (6). Comparing
uncontrolled models where the father is absent, model (3), and the model (4)
where the mother is absent, the probability that an immigrant child works is
larger when the father is absent than the other case.
For the models where we controlled for endogeneity, (7) and (8), we found the
same pattern, but the coefficients are much larger than any other model, 9.88%
and 9.28% respectively. Without conditioning to immigrant children, we also
found that that the probability of child labor is lower if the household is nuclear
with parents present, but larger if the father is absent; in magnitude these
coefficients are smaller than the case of immigrant children.
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These results provide evidence that it is more likely that children work if they are
immigrant and if the live in households with the mother being the head of the
family. We can also infer that estimating a joint probability between child labor
and migration that accounts for the unobservable affecting both decisions deliver
better estimated coefficients, since the Rho (ρ) coefficient is statistically significant
different from zero and the log-likelihood tests are larger than the Probit models,
which do not control for endogeneity.
In general, we can also see that control variables coefficients on comparable
models have the same direction for the child labor probability. In the case of the
Biprobit models, the coefficients are larger in magnitude and have smaller
standard errors relative to the Probit models. For this reason, we will focus on the
interpretation of the models (5)–(8) in Table 9. The coefficients shown on the
model (5), which considers the whole sample, are smaller than the estimated
coefficients obtained for nuclear families. In fact, when we compare the coefficients
for nuclear families, the largest coefficients, in absolute value, are estimated for
nuclear families with father absent while the lowest in nuclear families with
mother absent.
Similar to Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), Jensen and Nielsen (1997), Rosati and
Rossi (2001), we found that the probability of child labor of a immigrant child is
higher compared to a non migrant child, this probability increases with his age
and it is larger for boys relative to girls, see Graph A3.
We did not include a measure of the family income; the reason is because it is not
completely identified from the dataset used, especially for the cases where the
children do not migrate with their family. If this is the case, it would be
convenient to include children’s wage. However, in the descriptive section we
found that children work to get a monetary payment, not only to increase family
income but also to finance their expenditures, mainly if they are immigrant. Then,
it is not clear whether to include it as a measure of the family income.
To avoid a larger measurement error, instead, we include a binary variable
indicating whether the head of the family is working. We assume that the mother
is the head of the household in the model (7) since a father is absent, and the
father is the head of the family if the mother is absent, model (8). For the model
(6) where both are present they self-declare who is the head of the family. The
results imply that if the head of the family is employed the probability of child
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labor increases; although this effect seems counterintuitive. It is consistent with
Basu and Van (1998) argument that child and adult work is complementing.
Regarding the education, we found that the probability of child labor is reduced if
the education level of the head of the family increases relative to the head of the
family with no education. Similar to a previous paper based in Mexico Hanson
and Woodruff (2003), McKenzie and Rapoport (2011), the probability of child
labor is reduced in larger magnitude in localities with more than 100,000
populations relative to localities with less than 2,500 inhabitants. Then, the
probability of child labor is larger in rural localities relative to urbanized areas.
By region we observe that in the Pacific and South regions have the largest
probabilities of child labor relative to Northern states. Comparing the four models,
it is remarkable that the probability that children work is about 7.69% in the
families with the father absent in the Pacific region relative to northern states.
Also the probability of child labor is larger in Center and North Center relative to
Northern states. Only in the Capital, Distrito Federal and Estado de Mexico, the
probability of child labor is lower than in the Northern states, although none of
the coefficients are statistically significant.
Finally, in Biprobit models Table 9 we can account the indirect effect of
education on child labor. We build a set of interaction binary variables combining
currently school attendance and highest level attained. We observe an inverse
relationship between both variables as we expect, however, this effect is not
homogeneous for certain educational outcomes. However, older children may be
more apt to engage in work than in school not only because they may have
already completed at primary or secondary school, rather because they are more
productive in labor activities.
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Table 8. A probit model analysis of the decision to child labor
Model 1
All sample
Model 2
Nuclear Hh with
both parent’s
Model 3
Nuclear Hh with
father’s absent
Model 4
Nuclear Hh with
mother’s absent
Coeff StdError Coeff StdError Coeff StdError Coeff StdError
1 if child immigrant 0.0105** (2.157) 0.0242** (2.525) 0.0250** (2.612) 0.0242** (2.522)
1 if male child 0.0359*** (28.514) 0.0339*** (22.659) 0.0340*** (22.681) 0.0339*** (22.630)
Age 0.0096*** (6.870) 0.0091*** (5.403) 0.0091*** (5.405) 0.0093*** (5.482)
Age squared 0.0002*** (4.262) 0.0002*** (3.530) 0.0002*** (3.536) 0.0002*** (3.490)
1 if nuclear household -0.00114 (-0.765)
1 if Hh with both parents -0.0122*** (-5.761)
1 if Hh with father's absent 0.0118*** (5.445)
1 if Hh with mother's absent 0.00812 (1.362)
Household size 0.00102** (2.898) 0.0037*** (6.672) 0.0036*** (6.457) 0.0027*** (5.121)
1 if Hh head employed 0.0315*** (16.883) 0.0270*** (10.394) 0.0270*** (10.372) 0.0247*** (9.612)
1 if Hh head's partial primary -0.0146*** (-5.632) -0.0104** (-2.838) -0.0105** (-2.861) -0.0110** (-3.003)
1 if Hh head's full primary -0.0222*** (-8.770) -0.0218*** (-6.151) -0.0219*** (-6.193) -0.0226*** (-6.384)
1 if Hh head's partial secondary -0.0246*** (-6.390) -0.0240*** (-4.961) -0.0241*** (-4.997) -0.0251*** (-5.192)
1 if Hh head's full secondary -0.0346*** (-13.648) -0.0348*** (-9.946) -0.0350*** (-10.006) -0.0357*** (-10.194)
1 if Hh head's preparatory or more -0.0578*** (-21.299) -0.0571*** (-15.630) -0.0573*** (-15.687) -0.0587*** (-16.080)
1 if loc with 100 000 or more pop -0.0237*** (-14.609) -0.0246*** (-12.558) -0.0247*** (-12.565) -0.0245*** (-12.470)
1 if loc with 15 000 to 99 999 pop -0.0152*** (-7.287) -0.0170*** (-6.750) -0.0170*** (-6.749) -0.0169*** (-6.703)
1 if loc with 2 500 to 14 999 pop -0.0156*** (-7.659) -0.0145*** (-5.983) -0.0145*** (-5.987) -0.0146*** (-6.025)
Center North 0.0149*** (7.241) 0.0132*** (5.372) 0.0132*** (5.366) 0.0134*** (5.469)
Center 0.0150*** (6.360) 0.0157*** (5.599) 0.0157*** (5.588) 0.0163*** (5.780)
Capital -0.00112 (-0.370) -0.00127 (-0.344) -0.00131 (-0.354) -0.00118 (-0.319)
Gulf 0.0136*** (6.035) 0.0132*** (4.877) 0.0132*** (4.882) 0.0132*** (4.849)
South 0.0190*** (8.462) 0.0163*** (6.038) 0.0163*** (6.042) 0.0168*** (6.184)
Pacific 0.0318*** (14.526) 0.0308*** (11.808) 0.0308*** (11.804) 0.0312*** (11.907)
Observations 95,496 67,305 67,305 67,305
Log likelihood -21,708.1 -15,162.2 -15,164.0 -15,177.7
McFadden's R2 0.202 0.194 0.194 0.193
R Count 91.85% 92.06% 92.06% 92.06%
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2013 MTI/ENOE.
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Table 9. A bivariate probit model analysis of the decision to child labor
Model 5
All sample
Model 6
Hh with both
parent’s
Model 7
Hh with father’s
absent
Model 8
Hh with mother’s
absent
Coeff StdError Coeff StdError Coeff StdError Coeff StdError
1 if child immigrant 0.0516*** (7.046) 0.0748*** (4.722) 0.0988*** (5.052) 0.0928*** (4.386)
1 if male child 0.0521*** (9.904) 0.0582*** (6.211) 0.0717*** (6.630) 0.0681*** (5.806)
Age 0.0144*** (5.161) 0.0159*** (3.811) 0.0196*** (3.934) 0.0190*** (3.754)
Age squared 0.00035*** (4.214) 0.00043*** (3.324) 0.00053*** (3.366) 0.00050** (3.212)
1 if nuclear household -0.00173 (-0.795)
1 if Hh with both parents -0.0231*** (-4.229)
1 if Hh with father's absent 0.0229*** (4.060)
1 if Hh with mother's absent 0.0152 (1.260)
Household size 0.0014** (2.752) 0.0064*** (4.648) 0.0076*** (4.554) 0.0055*** (3.756)
1 if Hh head employed 0.0357*** (8.733) 0.0383*** (5.399) 0.0481*** (5.636) 0.0423*** (5.002)
1 if Hh head's partial primary school -0.0184*** (-5.345) -0.0165** (-2.743) -0.0207** (-2.791) -0.0206** (-2.825)
1 if Hh head's full primary school -0.0273*** (-7.068) -0.0329*** (-4.591) -0.0413*** (-4.808) -0.0403*** (-4.474)
1 if Hh head's partial secondary school -0.0273*** (-6.290) -0.0337*** (-4.282) -0.0427*** (-4.450) -0.0418*** (-4.197)
1 if Hh head's full secondary school -0.0431*** (-8.364) -0.0541*** (-5.413) -0.0676*** (-5.755) -0.0654*** (-5.164)
1 if Hh head’s preparatory or more school -0.0660*** (-9.193) -0.0851*** (-5.875) -0.106*** (-6.320) -0.103*** (-5.524)
1 if loc with 100 000 or more pop -0.0350*** (-8.536) -0.0431*** (-5.736) -0.0530*** (-6.053) -0.0502*** (-5.408)
1 if loc with 15 000 to 99 999 pop -0.0193*** (-6.377) -0.0262*** (-4.739) -0.0326*** (-4.925) -0.0308*** (-4.502)
1 if loc with 2 500 to 14 999 pop -0.0197*** (-6.583) -0.0226*** (-4.507) -0.0282*** (-4.670) -0.0270*** (-4.329)
Center North 0.0236*** (5.591) 0.0241*** (3.985) 0.0295*** (4.109) 0.0288*** (3.926)
Center 0.0244*** (5.010) 0.0299*** (4.039) 0.0364*** (4.177) 0.0361*** (4.016)
Capital -0.00112 (-0.262) -0.00202 (-0.323) -0.00257 (-0.334) -0.00219 (-0.298)
Gulf 0.0219*** (4.872) 0.0246*** (3.728) 0.0301*** (3.831) 0.0285*** (3.645)
South 0.0319*** (6.136) 0.0310*** (4.259) 0.0379*** (4.415) 0.0371*** (4.204)
Pacific 0.0586*** (8.232) 0.0637*** (5.731) 0.0769*** (6.029) 0.0743*** (5.496)
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Table 9. A bivariate probit model analysis of the decision to child labor (continuation)
Model 5
All sample
Model 6
Hh with both
parent’s
Model 7
Hh with father’s
absent
Model 8
Hh with mother’s
absent
Coeff StdError Coeff StdError Coeff StdError Coeff StdError
1 if child immigrant
Currently schooled*Partial primary -0.0149*** (-5.347) -0.0123*** (-1.954) -0.0152*** (-1.910) -0.0143*** (-1.879)
Currently schooled*Full primary -0.0166*** (-4.920) -0.0130*** (-1.869) -0.0162*** (-1.826) -0.0152*** (-1.799)
Currently schooled*Partial Secondary -0.0159*** (-5.186) -0.0077*** (-1.511) -0.0096*** (-1.486) -0.0089*** (-1.468)
Currently schooled*Full secondary -0.0148*** (-4.255) -0.0132*** (-1.735) -0.0165*** (-1.695) -0.0154*** (-1.673)
Currently schooled*Preparatory -0.0144*** (-4.029) -0.0072*** (-1.196) -0.0089*** (-1.181) -0.0084*** (-1.170)
Observations 95,496 67,305 67,305 67,305
Log likelihood -28273.0 -16,972.0 -1,6973.8 -16,987.6
Rho (p) -0.598 -0.403 -0.404 -0.398
Chi2 47.79 5.323 5.351 5.216
Note: Bivariate Probit model corresponds to conditional probability Proby1=1, y2=1x1, x2.
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2013 MTI/ENOE
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1.5. Conclusions
This paper set out in a little explored area, the effect of household immigration
on child labor. We set up a model that accounts for the endogeneity effect of
migration and other unobservable factor affecting both decisions, the decision
to child labor and decision to migrate. Our main substantive findings is that
compared to non migrant children, immigrants have more propensity to child
labor and, this condition is robust to a variety of specifications and controls.
For nuclear household, this propensity increase in households with father’s
absent, that is, in household where the mother is the head of the family.
Although we did not include family income, households with mother as the head
have lower income than in households with the father as the head of the family.
We also found results consistent to previous evidence on child labor that the
probability to work increases with age, it is larger for boys, and it is larger in
rural areas. In fact, we found that immigrant children are a vulnerable group,
even if they seem to have a higher level of education than non-migrant, they
work longer hours for a payment.
Similar other countries, child labor in Mexico are still observed, even less than
the age permitted by law. Among children, we found that immigrants are the
most observed vulnerability. If child labor is an obstacle to social and economic
development, and also drives possible intergenerational transmission or poverty.
The Mexican government should ensure the implementation of the UN
conventions on the Rights of the Child (UN CRC) and the ILO Child Labor
Conventions (No. 138, No. 182). Also, develop labor monitoring mechanism and
oversight of child labor in the informal economy, where most children work.
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1.7 Appendix
Table A1. Variables definition
Variables definition
Dependent variables
Child labor:  1 if child labor and, 0 otherwise
Immigrant Household: 1 if immigrant household, 0 otherwise
Independent variables
a) Children’s characteristics
1 if male child: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if currently schooling: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if partial primary: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if full primary: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if partial secondary: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if full secondary: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if preparatory or more: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
b) Household characteristics
Household size: Number of members living in the household.
1 if nucleus Household: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
Hh head earnings
1 if Hh head employed: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if Hh with both parents: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if Hh with father's absent: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if Hh with mother's absent: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if Hh head's not schooling: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if Hh head's partial primary school: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if Hh head's full primary school: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if Hh head's partial secondary school: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if Hh head's full secondary school: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
1 if Hh head's preparatory or + school: Dummy variable (Yes=1), 0 otherwise
c) Other controls
Less than 2 500 hab
2,500 to 14 999 hab
15 000 to 99 999 hab
100 000 or more hab
North: BC, SON, CHIH, NL, TAM, COAH.
Center North: DGO, ZAC, SLP, AGS, GTO, QRO.
Center: HGO, TLAX, PUE, MOR.
Capital: DF, MEX.
Gulf: VER, TAB, CAM, ZAC, QROO.
South: MICH, GRO, OAX, CHIS.
Pacific: JAL, NAY, SIN, BCS, COL.
Source: Variables definition based on 2013 MTI/ENOE.
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Table A2. Summary descriptive statistics
Variable min max mean SD N
1 if child labor 0 1 0.083 0.275 95,496
1 if child immigrant 0 1 0.013 0.113 95,496
Age 5 17 11.063 3.712 95,496
1 if male child 0 1 0.510 0.500 95,496
1 if child currently schooled 0 1 0.932 0.252 95,496
1 if child non schooling 0 1 0.185 0.389 95,496
1 if child with partial primary school 0 1 0.418 0.493 95,496
1 if child with completed primary school 0 1 0.096 0.294 95,496
1 if child with partial secondary school 0 1 0.151 0.358 95,496
1 if child with completed secondary school 0 1 0.088 0.283 95,496
1 if preparatory or more schooling 0 1 0.062 0.241 95,496
Household size 2 24 5.196 1.829 95,496
1 if nuclear household 0 1 0.705 0.456 95,496
1 if nuclear household with both parents 0 1 0.860 0.347 67,305
1 if nuclear household with father’s absent 0 1 0.128 0.335 67,305
1 if nuclear household with mother’s absent 0 1 0.011 0.107 67,305
1 if male household head 0 1 0.773 0.419 95,496
1 if Hh head’s employed 0 1 0.843 0.364 95,496
1 if Hh head's non schooling 0 1 0.055 0.229 95,496
1 if Hh head's partial primary school 0 1 0.127 0.333 95,496
1 if Hh head's full primary school 0 1 0.191 0.393 95,496
1 if Hh head's partial secondary school 0 1 0.034 0.182 95,496
1 if Hh head's full secondary school 0 1 0.302 0.459 95,496
1 if Hh head's preparatory or more school 0 1 0.291 0.454 95,496
1 if locality 100 000 or more population 0 1 0.545 0.498 95,496
1 if locality 15 000 to 99 999 population 0 1 0.132 0.339 95,496
1 if locality 2 500 to 14 999 population 0 1 0.133 0.340 95,496
1 if locality less than 2 500 population 0 1 0.189 0.392 95,496
North 0 1 0.177 0.382 95,496
Center North 0 1 0.208 0.406 95,496
Center 0 1 0.124 0.330 95,496
Capital 0 1 0.067 0.250 95,496
Gulf 0 1 0.142 0.349 95,496
South 0 1 0.143 0.350 95,496
Pacific 0 1 0.140 0.347 95,496
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2013 MTI/ENOE.
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Chapter 2. Intergenerational transmission of informal employment
in Mexico. A limited choice or better income prospects?
Intergenerational transmission of informal
employment in Mexico. A limited choice or
better income prospects?
2.1 Introduction
The intergenerational mobility (IGM, henceforth) is measured by the connection
between parents’ and adult children’s socioeconomic status, where higher
association means less social mobility Corak (2004). According to Torche (2013),
this socioeconomic standing is captured by different measures were the most
common are: individual earnings and family income, social class, and
occupational status.
Recent evidence show that family background has a dramatic impact on the
likelihood of remaining in the same sector of employment. In particular, evidence
shows that having a self–employment or informal occupation parents makes sons
significantly more likely to follow the same parents’ occupation, Hout and Rosen
(2000), Colombier and Masclet (2008), Pasquier–Doumer, (2012). Also, some
studies shows that informal employment is the result of an optimal choice where
individuals expect a higher welfare than if they were wage earners or
entrepreneurs in the formal sector Maloney and Ribeiro (1999), Maloney (2004),
Packard (2007).
Understanding the relationship between IGM and employment occupation is
essential for assessing the fairness of social mobility and earnings distribution. In
fact, the intergenerational transmission of the self–employed status is frequently
connected with high expected earnings Fairlie and Robb (2006), Colombier and
Masclet (2008). While there is no consensus on the voluntary nature of entry
into informal self-employment, strong evidence points to a strong
intergenerational transmission of employment status Pasquier–Doumer (2012).
In Mexico, the way that social mobility has been measured depending on the
specific aspects of social mobility of interest as well as on the available data.
Valero and Tijerina (2003), Castillo and Vela (2013), and Velez-Grajales and
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Velez-Grajales (2014) have been estimated a larger intergenerational social
mobility as it relates to entrepreneurial activity, income and occupations.
However, up to now, research regarding intergenerational transmissions of
employment occupations has only focused on sons and parents’ living in the
same household Valero and Tijerina (2003), Castillo and Vela, (2013), mainly
because there are not data from longitudinal surveys. This paper motivates the
use of a retrospective data collection 2011 EMOVI (Social Mobility Survey in
Mexico, EMOVI for its acronym in Spanish). 2011 EMOVI is an attractive
dataset for a retrospective data collection in Mexico. This survey collects current
respondents’ socioeconomic data and the comparable retrospective information
on their parents’ when the interviewee was 14 years old.
This interest motivates literature in labor economics addressing the
intergenerational relationship between parents and sons occupations. We provide
a further examination and robust check for this possibility controlling skill level,
parents’ occupation and family background. Different from the previous evidence
in Mexico, our study differs in three ways: (3) empirical strategy aims at
controlling as much as possible for heterogeneity sample, (1) microeconometric
framework derives from a structural model with expected wages explicitly
determining labor occupation decisions, (3) selectivity bias is achieved using a
two-steep estimation following Lee (1982) procedure.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly looks at some of the
associated literature. Section 3 introduces the model that is estimated and
discusses its identification. Section 4 highlights a few features from the data and
presents results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
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2.2 Literature review
A large number of economists suggest the existence of segmented labor markets,
Lewis (1954), Harris and Todaro (1970), have been highlighted that developing
countries are characterized by a dual labor market, consisting of a modern sector
that is organized and large informal sector with a reduced amount of efficiency.
This two groups of sectors seems to be operating in different labor markets. One
contains the primary segment of better paid and more attractive jobs, while the
secondary segment encompasses rather low paid, unqualified and short term jobs
Eichhorst and Kendzia, (2014). These jobs are characterized by low (or even
zero) marginal productivity which justifies the low wages. Hence, informal
employment appears as a constrained choice and a large informal sector involved
inefficiency Pasquier-Doumer, (2012), Mboutchouang et al., (2013).
Nevertheless, recent findings for some countries show that informal employment
is the result of an optimal choice where individuals expect a higher welfare than
if they were wage earners or entrepreneurs in the formal sector Maloney and
Ribeiro (1999), Packard (2007). More recent evidence views the informal sector
as an active and voluntary entrepreneurial small firm sector, where individuals
choose to be informal because they expect a greater welfare that if they wage–
earners of formal entrepreneurs Maloney, (2004). Hence, a proportion of informal
occupation may reflect an efficient allocation of labor Pasquier–Doumer (2012).
If there is no consensus on the voluntary nature to be engaged into informal
employment and efficiency of informal production units, some stylized facts lead
reflections toward and intergenerational transmission of informal
entrepreneurship status De Paul, Massil, and Modeste, (2013). In the economic
literature, the intergenerational transmission of the employed status is frequently
connected with high expected earnings Colombier and Masclet, (2008), Fairlie
and Robb (2006).
Evidence from Mexico show a high correlation between self-employment and the
informal sector of the economy, recently statistics show that almost 6 in 10
people are in the informal sector employment (ILO, 2012). Leal-Ordoñez (2013)
refers to four facts concerning informality in Mexico: 1) the informal sector in
Mexico is large, 2) the distribution of labor across establishment sizes has a
“missing middle”, 3) informal establishments are small, and 4) informal
establishments operate with low capital-labor ratios.
38
On this view, occupational status has an important advantage as a measure of
economic standing and is a weighted average of the mean level of earnings and
education of detailed occupations Torche (2013). In relation to wages differences
between both sectors, Moreno (2007) estimate the average conditional differences
using the Mincer equation. It corrected for selectivity to controlling the
heterogeneity among individuals in each sector. He finds that workers with
higher levels of education earn more in the formal sector, but, individuals with
high school or less receive higher wages in the informal sector, these results are
similar for woman with basic and secondary school.
Regarding the choice of being salaried employee in the formal or informal sector,
Huesca and Padilla (2012) use a contrafactual technique to estimate the wages
received if the workers are employed in both sectors. They found that workers
with high schooling attainment have more probability to work in the formal
sector and woman with low education attainment have more likelihood to work
in the informal sector. However, this likelihood changes with age, that is, people
between 40 and 45 years have more propensity to be employed in the formal
sector.
Few studies have addressed individual earnings from an intergenerational
approach. One of the first papers is by Valero and Tijerina (2003), they
estimates a Mincer equation for sons controlling by parent’s characteristics and
parent’s wages. They found the sons of parent’s employer and parent’s self-
employer have higher wages than sons whose parents were employed. This may
be caused due to the transmission of skills and training.
In regard to intergenerational transmission of occupational in Mexico, Castillo
and Vela (2013) use a probit model to estimate the probability that children
keep the same occupational position that their parents. They results indicate
that the social-domestic context have an influence in the labor decisions. Hence,
self-employed parents transmit informal human capital to their offspring.
However, this results could be affected because it does not correct for self-
selection bias in the employment decision and heterogeneity in the sample.
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2.3 Empirical strategy
2.3.1 Identification
A key issue in examining pay determination is worker preferences. In a narrow
sense, we might be interested in why a worker chooses to work in a particular
sector. The model is based on a binary representation of the employment status
decisions. Assume that there are two employment options available to each
individual: (1) informal sector or (2) a formal sector. Several important features
should be considered. First, informal sector regime is associated with more
flexibility and independence, usually, formal sector implies greater responsibility
and full-time job. Second, each sector has different working conditions and
different market institutions.
Similar to Rees and Shan (1986) we assume that employment status and
earnings are determined simultaneously. This requires a 3SLS estimation process.
In the first stage, we estimate a reduced form probit model of sector occupation
decision. This is used to construct a sample selection correction term. In the
second stage, we estimate an OLS standard Mincer equation to obtain an
earnings function. This is used to compare the differences in earnings between
both occupational sectors, and correct the bias in sample selection. And finally,
in the third stage, the differences in earnings are used to estimate a probit model
of the decision to be employed in the formal or informal occupation sector. 8
Following Lee (1982) self-selection correction, we assume a linear utility
function, informalU and formalU that represents the utility derived by individual i
from states of occupation.
)0)log(logPr()0Pr( formalinformalformalinformal*  iii εXγYYβαUUI (1)
Equation (1) can be estimated as a probit model. However, earnings are only
observed in one of the two states, so Lee (1982) two-stage procedure must be
used to construct predicted earning for each individual.
8 The self–selection problem has been analyzed in different context. For example, Lee (1978)
investigates the joint determination of the extent of unionism and the effect of unions on wage
rates. Adamchik and Bedi, (1983) examine whether there are any differential of workers in the
public and private sector, and others.
40
Hence, we define an indicator variable )( *iI as follow, )1( * iI if
0formalinformal UU and 0 otherwise. Thus that represents the individuals i’s
marginal propensity to choice occupation sector.
Individual i decides employed in the informal sector if 0* iI (2)
Individual i decides employed in the formal sector if 0* iI (3)
We estimate Mincer’s (1974) semi logarithmic wage function for the informal
workers )ln( informalY and formal workers )ln( formalY . Background characteristics,
notably occupational and sectoral choices of parents, are often used as a method
of identifying sectoral choices made by workers Dustmann and Van Soest (1998)
so that pay premia or penalties to working in a particular sector can be
conditioned on the potentially self–selected characteristics of the workers
(Koumenta, 2011 p. 227)
informaliinformalinformalinformal eZδαY )ln( (4)
formaliformalformalformal eZδαY )ln( (5)
Where )( iZ are covariate vectors, )(δ are coefficient vectors, and (e) are the error
terms  2,0 informalσN and  2,0 formalσN respectively. The model is identified by the
exclusion from )( iZ of elements of )( iX . Equation (1) can then be estimated
using the standard maximum likelihood procedure. However, estimating the
income equations (4) and (5) by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) might be
inappropriate because it fails to reflect the possibility of self-selection in the
decision to choose an occupation sector. For example, informal occupation
workers might have some unobserved characteristics that affect their income
generating capabilities.
To deal with possible self-selection bias, Lee (1982) methodology recommends
substituting income equations (4) and (5) into (1) and obtain the reduced form
of the sector occupation decision equation.
*
210
*
iiii εZβXββI  (6)
Assuming the error term )( *iε is normally distributed with unit variance,
Equation (6) can be estimated by a maximum likelihood probit and the fitted
values for the decision employment occupation probabilities. Hence, )ˆ( iψ are
used to calculate the selectivity correction variables or inverse Mill’s ratios as
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follow:  )ˆ(/)ˆ( iii ψFψf1H  and  )ˆ(1/)ˆ( iii ψFψf0H  , where )ˆ( iψF is the
standard cumulative distribution function and )ˆ( iψf is the standard normal
density function. Thus, )( i1H and )( i0H measure the truncation effect associated
with sample selectivity (see, for more details (Lee, 1982)).
As a result, the two income equation (4) and (5) are modified to incorporate the
inverse Mill’s ratio as follows:
informal
*
informaliinformalinformalinformal ησZδαY  H1)ln( (7)
formal
*
formalformalformalformal H0)ln( ησZδαY i  (8)
Thus, )( *informalσ and )( *formalσ corrects for selectivity bias in the observations, the
selectivity bias can be positive or negative. It can consider four different cases.
For example, if )0( *informalσ and )0( *formal σ , the implication is that each group
has a comparative advantage in its chosen employment status. Typically it
occurs when *informalσ is very large relative to *formalσ . Hence, individual with higher
skills enter professions with the greater variance in earnings, see, for more details
Madala, (1983).
Finally, OLS predicted values of earnings for individuals i in both informal
)ln( informalY and formal )ln( informalY occupation of (7) and (8) are substituted in
the structural form of the employment sector decision, Equation (1), to obtain
consistent parameter estimates.9
9 The model presented above is referred to as an endogenous switching regression model. It is
used to address issues of self selection and the estimation of treatment effects when there is no
random allocation of subjects to treatment and control groups as is generally the case with
observational (as opposed to experimental) data.
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2.4 Dataset and results
2.4.1 Informal employment definition
Measuring the size of the informal economy and the incidence of informal
employment has proved to be difficult. Also, different definitions are put forward
to perform the concept operational. The appropriate methodology for the
statistical measurement of informal employment depends on the users’
requirements, measurement objectives, and the organization of the national
system information.
There have been several definitions of the dividing line between the formal and
informal employment. For statistical proposes, The International Labor
Organization (ILO) in The Fifteen International Conference of Labor
Statistician Characterized (15th ICLS resolution) set up a definition according to
the following criteria: “encompasses persons in employment who, by law or in
practice, are not subject to national labor legislation and income tax or entitled
to social protection and employment benefits” ILO, 2013:4)10
Following the methodology recommended by the ILO, in Mexico informal
employment is defined as “employees without access to public or private health”.
This criterion is especially useful in countries where the registration of workers
entails the registration of the enterprises employing them with the social security
(most notably through the social security agencies, IMSS, ISSSTE, etcetera).
Although the employment relationships of workers in informal employment are
heterogeneous, they share a basic vulnerability. Namely, they need to be self–
supporting and to rely on informal arrangements. 11
10 For more details see, “Resolution concerning statistics of employment in the informal sector”,
adopted by the Fifteenth International Conference of Labor Statisticians (15th ICLS resolution).
11 The ILO and international reached a consensus with respect to the concept in two dimensions.
First, the type of nature of the economic unit, in other words, if the unit dedicated to the
production of goods or services operates using household resources and does not keep basic
accounts records. Second, refers to all employment that is not subject to labor law or an
institutional framework, regardless of whether the economic units employing the workers are
unregistered enterprises or formal enterprises.
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2.4.2 The data
The dataset used for the empirical analysis is the 2011 EMOVI (Social Mobility
Survey in Mexico, EMOVI, for its acronym in Spanish). It is a nationally
representative household survey which was conducted in 2006 and 2011.12
EMOVI is retrospective socioeconomic data that collects current respondents’
information and the comparable retrospective data on their parent’s occupation,
and household conditions when interviewee’s was 14 years old. We use the data
from the second wave in 2011, which includes almost 11,001 individuals between
25 to 64 years old (both household heads and non-household heads). This survey
track the socioeconomic variables of a given household, each household member
is asked detailed questions about age, gender, marital status, educational level,
labor market participation, working hours, employment status, as well as
household size and other features.
2.4.3 Sample and descriptive statistics
Since our goal is to study the interaction between son and parents’ occupation,
we define our estimation sample according to the following criteria. Informal
work regime is identified by the question. As part of this job do you receive
health care benefits? This question is consistent with ILO recommendation and
it is applicable for sons and their parents.
We exclude unemployment workers, pensioners, students, as well as people with
a disability. We restrict to full-time workers –defined for our purpose as those
who only have one job and work 30 or more hours per week– who provide
information on their earnings and occupation. In the case of earnings, we exclude
observations with values smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than the 99th
percentile. This cutoff point is of course arbitrary, but it is frequently used in
related studies.
Also, we exclude the female population for the subsequent reasons. First, full-
time workers are predominantly a male labor participation. Second, the quite
restrictive selection is made to prevent the results from being affected by sample
selection bias, that occurs if unobservable characteristics, which affect the work
12 This survey is designed by the Espinosa Rugarcia Foundation and the Center for Studies
Espinosa Yglesias (CEEY).
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decision, are correlated with characteristics that affect the process determining
to work. These restrictions are justified by the aim to form a relatively
homogeneous sample of employment occupations and wages. The final sample
consists of 2,633 individuals where earnings and transitions into employment
status can be observed. Table A1 contains summary statistics of the sample, it
includes the maximum, minimum, mean and standard deviation of each variable.
As a starting point, Table 1 reports intergenerational mobility regime. Each
row of the table shows the occupation of the father while columns indicate the
occupation category of the sons. If we consider the column percentages instead
(that is, the share of each class from each background category); among, 75
percent and 40 percent were immobile (their occupations was the same category
as their father’s) into informal and formal occupation, respectively. Also, a
significant percentage of sons moving into the informal sector, about 60 percent,
while a small percentage shifts to the formal sector, about 25 percent. Overall,
prevalence is observed towards informality.
Table 1. Intergenerational mobility between occupation
Father’s
occupation
Son’s occupation
Total
Formal Informal
Formal 380 577 957
40% 60% 100%
Informal 416 1,260 1,676
25% 75% 100%
Total 796 1,837 2,633
30% 70% 100%
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
From Table 2, it can be seen that there is a significant difference between
individuals working on the informal and formal sector in most respects. The
implication of this is that, simply looking at differences in earnings cannot
identify the informality wage penalty, but rather regression analysis is required
to find the ceteris paribus effect of occupation sector upon earnings.
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As for other features, individuals educational level is measured by dummy
variables that assume the value of one if the individuals have concluded.
Significant differences were observed in the levels of schooling. Informal workers
observed a lower level of schooling. Regarding the intergenerational factor it is
observed that informal workers had parents with lower levels of schooling.13
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by employment status
Variable
All informal
(Obs=1,837)
All formal
(Obs=796) MeanDiffMean SD Mean SD
Log hourly wage 2.754 0.691 3.192 0.611 -0.438***
Age 37.458 11.675 35.734 9.775 1.725***
Experience 23.112 13.475 19.09 11.096 4.022***
Less than primary 0.157 0.364 0.054 0.226 0.103***
Primary completed 0.241 0.428 0.146 0.353 0.095***
Secondary completed 0.560 0.497 0.644 0.479 -0.085***
University completed 0.043 0.203 0.156 0.363 -0.113***
Father's completed years schooling 3.507 3.91 5.185 4.411 -1.678***
Mother’s completed years schooling 3.475 3.784 5.018 4.075 -1.543***
* p < 0.1, ** <0.05, ***p<0.01
Source: Author’s calculation based on  2011 EMOVI
13 The Mexican education system is characterized by 6 years of primary education, followed by 6
years of secondary education. Secondary education is divided in 3 years of lower secondary
education (secundaria) and 3 years of upper secondary education (preparatoria). Hence, Less
than primary (less than 6 years), Primary completed (6 years of schooling) Secondary completed
(less than 15 years completed) Colleague (more than 16 years completed).
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2.4.4 Correction for self–selection
The first step is to compute the selection corrected wages. Regression include
full–time male workers between 25 and 64 years of age. To compute the ‘inverse
Mill’s ratios’ of selectivity correction variables, the reduced form of the regimen
employment decision equation (6) includes as independent variables: experience,
experience squared, marital status, number of children, father’s employment
regime, locality size, and seven dummies for region. The estimated coefficients of
are reported in Table A2.
Subsequently, with the fitted values of equation (7) at hand, we compute both
inverse Mill’s ratios  )ˆ(/)ˆ(1 iii ψFψfH  and  )ˆ(1/)ˆ(0 iii ψFψfH  for all
individuals. Then we use the standard “log level” Mincer equation to wages
estimation, this involves regressing the natural log of the hourly wage upon
levels of independent variables. The informal workers regime equation (7) and
formal workers regime equation (8) also includes the correction selection variable
or inverse Mills ratio, H1 and H0, respectively.14
In order to observe differences, the exercise is performed for the entire sample
and for two groups of workers according to their skill level. Estimated
coefficients are displayed in Table 4. The coefficient in the wage equation
reports the estimate for selectivity correction term in equations (7) and (8). In
both cases it is statistically significant. It can be shown that there is both a
positive selection into informal and formal regime occupation. That is, those who
choose informal regime are better than average of informal workers and those
who choose formal are better than average of formal workers.
14 The reduced–form equation contain the selectivity variables which were estimated rather than
observed. It is well know that although OLS produces consistent estimates of the parameters this
is not true for the standard error. Then, we use the correction to the variance covariance matrix
following Lee (1978) procedure.
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The finding of positive selection bias for both workers is consistent with the
hypothesis that those who have chosen the employee status posses comparative
advantage at it.15
Note that the positive selection remains for both skill levels for informal workers,
while for formal workers positive selection only remains for those with high skill
level. Thus, earnings of formal workers with low skill level are not significantly
different from what their earnings would have been had they chose to be
informal workers.
15 A tighter interpretation is as follows. Consider the subsample of formal and informal workers
with the same measured characteristics. Then the earnings distribution actually observed for
formal is higher than the distribution that would be observed for the average individual in the
subsample had he chosen to be informal (Rees and Shan, 1986 p. 102). In other words, the
average earnings of individual with given measured characteristics who have chosen to be formal
is greater than what formal earnings would be for those with the same measured characteristics
who chose informal. See Graph A1. Wage distribution by occupation status.
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Table 4. Wage equations corrected by self-selectivity
Informal workers Formal workers
Variable All
workers
Low
skill
level
High
skill
level
All
workers
Low
skill
level
High
skill
level
Experience 0.016** 0.017* 0.007 0.003 -0.012 0.011
(0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013)
Experience squared -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1 if married 0.056 0.037 0.140* 0.072 0.083 0.073
(0.035) (0.041) (0.068) (0.050) (0.066) (0.072)
Has a sons 0.074* 0.072 0.097 0.035 -0.038 0.071
(0.037) (0.044) (0.067) (0.052) (0.070) (0.074)
H1 -1.278*** -1.006*** -1.834***
(0.102) (0.223) (0.189)
1.623*** 0.356 2.754***
(0.135) (0.290) (0.281)
Constant 2.114*** 2.323*** 1.657*** 3.563*** 3.327*** 3.675***
(0.098) (0.148) (0.182) (0.083) (0.191) (0.116)
Demographic charts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family of origin charcs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies for region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,837 1,313 524 796 388 408
R2 0.167 0.124 0.203 0.177 0.041 0.239
Controls: Demographic characteristics: age, age squared, schooling, schooling squared. Family
of origin characteristics: number of siblings, one-parent family. Locality size: Rural. Dummies for
region: North, Center North, Center, Capital, Gulf, South and Pacific.
Low skill level: Workers with less than 9 years schooling completed (secundaria or less).
High skill level: Worker with more than 9 years schooling completed (more than secundaria)
Notes. Standard error in parentheses
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
In addition, Table 5 reports the corrected predicted wage by schooling level and
age. That is, the wage for workers according to employment status, and the
wage they would get if they worked in a different regime of their status.
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Hence, working in the informal sector, formal workers receive higher wages than
informal, but, this gap is statistically significant except for the university
complete level. On the other hand, working in the formal sector, formal workers
also receive higher wages. Another significant result are the ware returns for
each sector. We observe that age have no linear effect to informal workers,
increasing relatively slowly at first, and then decreasing later about 35 years.
This effect is opposite to the formal sector where a slowly increasing effect is
observed.
Table 5. Predicted wage corrected by employment status
Characteristics
Working on informal sector Working on formal sector
To
informal
workers
To
formal
workers
Mean Diff
To
informal
workers
To
formal
workers
Mean Diff
Less than primary 2.448 2.537 -0.089*** 2.796 2.785 0.011
Primary complete 2.643 2.743 -0.100*** 2.905 2.945 -0.040**
Secondary complete 2.845 2.954 -0.109*** 3.116 3.192 -0.076***
University complete 3.298 3.361 -0.063 3.538 3.564 -0.026
Age    =   25 years 2.752 2.915 -0.162*** 2.986 3.147 -0.161***
30 years 2.777 2.945 -0.168*** 3.003 3.147 -0.144***
35 years 2.837 2.957 -0.120** 3.049 3.190 -0.141***
40 years 2.773 3.058 -0.285*** 3.031 3.238 -0.207***
More than 45 years 2.678 2.982 -0.304*** 3.098 3.296 -0.198***
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
On average, if those formal workers were allocated to the informal wage regimen,
they would have higher wages than those who in fact are informal workers.
Intuitively, that is consistent with an informal workers enjoying a significant
comparative earnings advantage over a formal workers regime, given a particular
set of other observer characteristics. Hence, those who choose to be informal
employment have upper endowments of desirable employment characteristics
(can be thought of as ability) than those workers who choose formal regime.
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2.4.5 The structural probit equation
Finally, using the corrected estimated coefficients of the two wage equations, we
compute earnings difference for each individual between informal and formal
sector. This is then included in the structural probit to obtain consistent
parameters, equation (1). Similar to wage equation correction. We compute for
the entire sample and for two groups of workers according to their skill level.
Results by skill level are presented in the Appendix. Table A3 for low skill
level, and Table A4 for high skill level.
The estimated for entire sample are reported in Table 6, we show the marginal
effects at means of the probability to choose informal work regimen, as we
describe in equation (1). Robust standard error are reported in parentheses
The coefficient that related wage differentials is positive and strongly significant
coefficient in the models presented, even when family background characteristics
are included as controls. That is, due to the difference between wage in the
informal and formal sectors the more likely an individual is to decide working in
the informal sector. Hence, a one per cent increase in the ratio of the predicted
formal wage raises the probability that an individual working in the informal
sector about 0.32 percent points. Although there is very little difference between
the average wage of the informal and the wage of formal workers, informal
workers have inferior human capital characteristics.
The role of education is relevant, that is, it has a direct effect on the wages of
workers, however, we found that the probability of working in the informal
sector decrease, as schooling improvement. Schooling therefore could embody
two aspects of human capital, one is to increase the labor productivity and the
other is to reduce the wages variance due to homogenize the skill of workers,
mainly for university completed level. Coefficient of marital status, confirm that
being married reduce the probability to be informal, that is due to the benefits
that social security offers to their family.
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Regarding to retrospective data on their parent’s when interviewee’s was 14
years old. We include parent’s occupation, indigenous condition, schooling,
preference that son's study, number of siblings, and household size. 16
As we expected, having a father’s with informal work is shown to have positive
effect on the probability to choose informal employment. This coefficient is
statistically significant in overall models. Mother’s coefficient is not significant
mainly because of low labor participation of women in Mexico in those years.
Also, we found that parent’s education also reduces the likelihood of employed
in the informal sector. In relation to parents' indigenous conditions, we found a
positive effect on both parents. These results support the high correlation
between indigenous conditions and low education attainment.
16 One important variable is the position of the interviewee between the brothers, however, this
variable is not available in the survey.
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Table 6. Structural probit equation to all sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE
Log hourly difference 0.0374*** (-5.637) 0.0313*** (-4.633) 0.0322*** (-4.813) 0.0302*** (-4.472)
Age -0.0137 (-1.838) -0.0174* (-2.316) -0.0172* (-2.291) -0.0186* (-2.470)
Age squared 0.000152 (1.669) 0.0001* (2.096) 0.0001* (2.056) 0.0002* (2.243)
Less than primary 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.)
Primary completed -0.0637* (-2.484) -0.0452 (-1.583) -0.0510 (-1.819) -0.0403 (-1.389)
Secondary completed -0.199*** (-8.328) -0.154*** (-5.626) -0.163*** (-6.104) -0.147*** (-5.252)
University completed -0.460*** (-11.40) -0.368*** (-8.091) -0.397*** (-8.931) -0.360*** (-7.808)
1 if married -0.0666** (-3.027) -0.0672** (-3.042) -0.0635** (-2.880) -0.0662** (-2.996)
1 if has a sons 0.0339 (1.465) 0.0376 (1.611) 0.0293 (1.256) 0.0352 (1.504)
1 if father's with informal work 0.136*** (7.007) 0.138*** (7.040)
Father's years of schooling -0.008*** (-3.494) -0.00428 (-1.310)
1 if father's preference to study -0.065*** (-3.304) -0.0653** (-3.255)
1 if father's indigenous 0.0703* (2.569) -0.0174 (-0.370)
1 if mother's with informal work 0.0563 (1.537) 0.0323 (0.871)
Mother's years of schooling -0.0117*** (-4.448) -0.00625 (-1.774)
1 if mother's preference to study -0.0146 (-0.425) 0.0183 (0.520)
1 if mother's indigenous 0.103*** (3.690) 0.109* (2.243)
Family origin characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies for region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2633 2633 2633 2633
Log lik. -1,500.8 -1,457.2 -1,479.9 -1,452.2
McFadden's R2 0.0699 0.0969 0.0828 0.1000
Count R 71.48% 72.24% 72.01% 72.92%
Log hourly difference = formalinformal YY ˆlnˆln  .
Controls: Family of origin characteristics: number of siblings, household size. Locality size: Rural.  Dummies for region: North, Center North,
Center, Capital, Gulf, South and Pacific. Marginal effects; robust standard error in parentheses; discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
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2.5 Conclusions
This paper motivates the use of a retrospective data EMOVI 2011. Unlike
previous studies in Mexico, this survey provides data about family background
to understand the relationship between intergenerational occupation status. The
contributions of this paper, by focusing on retrospective data, set up a
microeconometric framework with expected wages explicitly determining labor
occupation decisions, and controlling as much as possible for heterogeneity
sample.
The empirical results highlight the following aspects. The finding of positive
selection bias for both workers groups is consistent with the hypothesis that
those who have chosen the employee status posses comparative advantage at it.
Also, significant coefficients show that not correct for self–selection bias might
cause wrong results if ignored. That is, structural model of the selection decision
show that wage differential between informal and formal workers has a strong
and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of choosing informal work.
Due to the difference between wage in the informal and formal sectors the more
likely an individual is to decide working in the informal sector.
An important finding of this research is the intergenerational transmission of
informal work status between sons and parents. This strong probability to
choose the same informality father’s occupation could be explained by the
existence of comparative advantages for those children whose parents were
employed in the informal sector, and also wage differences between the two
sectors. Hence, individuals with informal parent’s occupation have less likelihood
to be enrolled in the formal sector.
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2.7 Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. N
1 if informal occupation 0 1 0.69 0.46 2,633
Hourly earnings (log) 0.22 5.85 2.89 0.7 2,633
Age 25 64 36.94 11.16 2,633
Age square 625 4096 1488.86 934.51 2,633
Experience 1 58 21.9 12.93 2,633
Experience squared 1 3364 646.65 730.26 2,633
Completed years schooling 0 26 9.04 4 2,633
1 if live with couple 0 1 0.64 0.48 2,633
1 if have sons 0 1 0.61 0.49 2,633
Number of sons 0 13 1.36 1.54 2,633
1 if father's with informal occupation 0 1 0.64 0.48 2,633
Father's completed years schooling 0 23 4.01 4.14 2,633
1 if father's indigenous spoken 0 1 0.16 0.37 2,633
1 if father's preference to study 0 1 0.5 0.5 2,633
1 if mother's with informal occupation 0 1 0.11 0.32 2,633
Mother’s completed years schooling 0 22 3.94 3.94 2,633
1 if father's indigenous spoken 0 1 0.15 0.36 2,633
1 if father's preference to study 0 1 0.13 0.33 2,633
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
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Table A2. Employment regimen decision
Variable dy/dx SE
Years of schooling -0.0097*** (-1.261)
Schooling squared -0.0009*** (-2.565)
Household size -0.0125*** (-2.609)
1 if living in couple -0.0273* (-1.054)
Has a sons -0.0082 (-0.316)
Father with informal employment 0.1090*** (5.778)
Father's years of schooling -0.0049*** (-1.546)
Mother's years of schooling -0.0018*** (-0.537)
1 if rural locality (less than 2,500 hab) 0.0682** (2.965)
Family of origin characteristics Yes
Dummies for region Yes
Observations 2,633
Log lik. -1438.2
McFadden's R2 0.109
Count R 72.35%
Controls: Dummies for region: North, Center North, Center, Capital, Gulf, South and Pacific.
Marginal effects; standard error in parentheses; discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
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Graph A1. Wage distribution by occupation status
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
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Table A3. Structural probit equation to low skill level workers
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE
Log hourly difference 0.0467*** (5.867) 0.0392*** (4.822) 0.0414*** (5.104) 0.0382*** (4.700)
Age -0.00614 (-0.774) -0.0100 (-1.256) -0.0109 (-1.359) -0.0120 (-1.499)
Age squared 0.0000395 (0.411) 0.0000859 (0.888) 0.0000909 (0.938) 0.000108 (1.110)
Years of schooling -0.0229*** (-5.240) -0.0157*** (-3.433) -0.0169*** (-3.708) -0.0144** (-3.142)
Married -0.0625** (-2.582) -0.0667** (-2.765) -0.0609* (-2.515) -0.0663** (-2.744)
Has a sons 0.0234 (0.888) 0.0329 (1.252) 0.0282 (1.070) 0.0351 (1.334)
1 if father's with informal occup 0.128*** (5.896) 0.127*** (5.794)
Father's years of schooling -0.00979** (-2.973) -0.00598 (-1.369)
1 if father's preference to study -0.0647** (-2.985) -0.0634** (-2.879)
1 if father's indigenous 0.0480 (1.673) -0.0310 (-0.630)
1 if mother's with informal occup 0.0345 (0.832) 0.0222 (0.529)
Mother's years of schooling -0.0123*** (-3.667) -0.00586 (-1.312)
1 if mother's preference to study -0.0490 (-1.201) -0.0270 (-0.650)
1 if mother's indigenous 0.0755* (2.555) 0.0945 (1.871)
Family origin characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies for region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,701 1,701 1,701 1,701
Log lik. -871.9 -843.1 -859.1 -840.1
McFadden's R2 0.0455 0.0770 0.0595 0.0802
Count R 77.19% 77.48% 77.72% 77.60%
Log hourly difference = formalinformal YY ˆlnˆln 
Controls: Family of origin characteristics: Number of siblings, one-parent family. Locality size: Rural.  Dummies for region: North,
Center North, Center, Capital, Gulf, South and Pacific. Marginal effects; robust standard error in parentheses; discrete change dummy
variable from 0 to 1
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
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Table A2. Structural probit equation to high skill level workers
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE
Log hourly difference 0.0398*** (4.516) 0.0338*** (3.774) 0.0350*** (3.932) 0.0330*** (3.678)
Age -0.0267* (-2.487) -0.0287** (-2.665) -0.0271* (-2.516) -0.0290** (-2.689)
Age squared 0.000311* (2.315) 0.000330* (2.455) 0.000310* (2.304) 0.000333* (2.478)
Years of schooling -0.0374*** (-8.390) -0.0311*** (-6.604) -0.0337*** (-7.296) -0.0309*** (-6.523)
1 if married -0.0766** (-2.603) -0.0804** (-2.715) -0.0752* (-2.547) -0.0804** (-2.708)
1 if has a sons 0.0525 (1.730) 0.0599 (1.955) 0.0503 (1.646) 0.0576 (1.872)
1 if father's with informal work 0.153*** (6.086) 0.156*** (6.117)
Father's years of schooling -0.00626* (-2.062) -0.00381 (-0.957)
1 if father's preference to study -0.0686** (-2.675) -0.0706** (-2.705)
1 if father's indigenous 0.0747* (1.972) -0.0236 (-0.368)
1 if mother's with informal work 0.0142 (0.307) -0.0206 (-0.435)
Mother's years of schooling -0.00878** (-2.704) -0.00383 (-0.890)
1 if mother's preference to study -0.0144 (-0.341) 0.0268 (0.617)
1 if mother's indigenous 0.111** (2.862) 0.122 (1.855)
Family origin characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies for region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,744 1,744 1,744 1,744
Log lik. -1084.5 -1056.5 -1074.8 -1054.3
McFadden's R2 0.0526 0.0771 0.0611 0.0790
Count R 65.65% 67.49% 65.88% 67.60%
Log hourly difference = formalinformal YY ˆlnˆln 
Controls: Family of origin characteristics: Number of siblings, one-parent family. Locality size: Rural.  Dummies for region: North,
Center North, Center, Capital, Gulf, South and Pacific. Marginal effects; robust standard error in parentheses; discrete change dummy
variable from 0 to 1
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
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Chapter 3. Leaving the nest or living with her
parents: Evidence from Mexican
millennia’s generation
Leaving the nest or living with her parents:
Evidence from Mexican millennia’s generation
3.1 Introduction
In Mexico, 2010 census enumerated that 67 percent young adults aged 20 to 29
years still living with their parents, 29 percent living with a partner and about 4
percent living alone. Why young adults co-residence with her parents beyond
mature age has several issue. By way of illustration, implication of the delay in
independence is related to the delay in cohabitation, marriage and fertility with
negative effect of birth rate; also, it has important implications on the economic
independence of adult’s children in the labor market Chiuri and Del Boca (2008).
Living with parent’s serves as an important mechanism through with parents
transfer resources to their adult’s sons. Usually, these resources are fundamental in
enabling young people to complete their education, or establish families of their
own Cobb-Clark (2008). Also, living with parents might affect the decision to enter
the labor market, consisting with this hypothesis, Chiuri and Del Boca (2008)
found that children living in household where both parents are working may
experience low unemployment rates, whereas those living in household where the
mother is not working, or she is just a discourage seeker, will be experience high
unemployment rates.
In addition, Becker et al., (2008) test whether co–residence is associated with
higher job insecurity, in other words, young adults when facing income risk are
more likely to postpone irreversible choices, such as household formation and
decision to enter the labor market
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Given the background, millennia’s generation is especially interesting. As an
illustration, 2010 U.S. Census data shows that Millennia’s are significantly worse
off economically than either Gen Xers of Baby Boomers at a similar stage of life.
Their poverty rate is nearly double than other generations, more live with their
parents, and the home ownership rate is nearly 10 percent lower than other groups
(APA, 2014 p. 7) –unfortunately, in Mexico there are no studies comparing
economic performance across generations–.17
The case of Mexico presents some considerations. According to 2015 Mexican
Intercensal Survey, Millennia’s Generation (individuals aged 15 to 35 years)
represents the main generation in Mexico, comprising roughly 35% of the total
population. This generation presents some relevant socio economic characteristics’,
for example, millennia’s have more educational outcomes than previous
generations, and however, it is also a generation that may have affected their
economic performance due to episodes of economic crisis.18
This paper adds to the literature by examining the determinants of children’s
propensity to live with their parents. First, analysis focuses on the educational
achievement of children, from this perspective, parents are helping to finance their
sons and daughters’ investment in human capital by providing them with shelter,
and possibly other goods and services, while co residing. Second, we have specific
interest other individual characteristics such as gender differences, marital status,
and siblings’. Third, we incorporate retrospective information about household
conditions and parent’s characteristics such as, schooling and labor participation
when the interviewee was 14 year old.
17 Generational cohorts are just one way to categorize a group of people with similarities.
Following Eddy and McGinnis (2015) cohorts for generations are as follow:  Baby boom
(1946–1965); Generation X (1965–1979); Millennia’s Generation (1980–1999); Generation Z
(2000–today).
18 For example, 1995 pesos crisis had differential impacts on income and consumption
across groups, more highly educated heads and those living in metropolitan areas
experienced much larger declines in income than unschooled heads and rural household.
Income per capita is estimated to have fallen by 17 per cent in agriculture, compared to 35
per cent in constructions and in comer, and 48 per cent in financial services (Pereznieto,
2010 p. 15). Similarly, income per capita of rural laborers fell by less than of non–
agricultural workers McKenzie (2003).
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In this paper, we take advantage of the rich micro data sets available for Mexico.
2011 EMOVI (Social Mobility Survey in Mexico, EMOVI for its acronym in
Spanish) contains nationally representative sample of individual aged 25 to 64
years, ant its retrospective information that allows to connect comparable data
from parent’s, when the interviewee’s was 14 years old. In other words, out data
provide information for both cohabiting and non cohabiting children.19
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
describes a theoretical model of living arrangements between sons and their
parents. Section 4 describes the data and presents summary statistics. Section 5
outlines the econometric methodology and results. Section 6 concludes.
19 This survey is designed by the Espinosa Rugarcia Foundation and the Center for Studies
Espinosa Yglesias (CEEY).
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3.2 Literature review
Multi–generational household (MGH henceforth) is a family unit where the head of
household lives with their sons or daughter and their grandchildren or when the
householder is living with their child and their parent or parent-in-law. A MGH
includes at least two adult generations (for example, parents and adult children
ages 25 or older were either generation can be the household head) or two non-
sequential generations (for example, grandparents and grandchildren of any age).20
Leaving the parental home is a fundamental demographic transition related to
other demographic transitions including partnering and parenting. In recent
decades, co residence and the age of leaving home have increased, mainly due to
the weak labor market, escalating housing costs and increased educational
opportunities Cobb-Clark (2008).21
Co residence allows young adults to consume, save and keep certain benefits that
perhaps living away from home they could not have, even with parental financial
transfers. Co residence allows parents to transfer resources to their adult children
and enable them to complete their education, enter the labour market, and
establish families of their own (Cobb-Clark 2008, p. 3). Also, co residence might be
considered a form of non-employment insurance Becker et al., (2005), McElroy
(1985).
Parent’s income level and its influence on leaving home are a well-studied variable,
and its effects are diverse. For example, high parental income could either support
the setting up of adult children’s own household. In the case of parental transfers,
they may be at least as important as public transfers in supporting young adults
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, (1993).
20 Historically, Ruggles, (2003) suggest that the decline of the multigenerational family in
the twentieth century is connected to the labor market and the diminishing importance of
agricultural and occupational inheritance. Usually, elderly farmer needed an adult child or
child–in–law to do heavy work when they were no longer capable of doing it themselves.
21 In the Western world, after the Great Depression and World War II, and up to the
1970s, more people experienced independence living before marriage, though in certain
countries leaving home remained closely tied to it DaVanzo and Goldscheier (1990).
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There are several channels that influence leaving home decision. For example, most
countries with weak welfare state evidence more dependence of adult children from
their parents, Aasve et al., (2002). In this context, youth’s actual or expected
employment status and labor income are determining factors in the decision to
leave or stay in the parental home Ermisch (1999).22
Conversely, countries with more generous welfare states –high public support for
youth–, there seems to be little effect of employment and earnings in the decision
to leave home. Results are questionable due to the fact that most young people
leave too early, mainly to continue their education, sheltered by public resources.
Aasve et al., (2002),
In addition, labor, housing, education and income-support policies are relevant in
the decision to leave home Cobb-Clark (2008). Countries with high enrolment
ratios in higher education explain the early departure from the parental home
Ermisch (1986).
Based on socio demographic approach, family composition and other characteristics
as gender, religion and ethnicity are determinants in living arrangements. Co
residence is an important mechanism through which different generations transfer
resources between them. In most developed countries, resources predominantly flow
from parents to their adult children. However, there are cultures where resources
and support are bidirectional. This is common in countries such as Spain and Italy
Cobb-Clark (2008). Also, co–residence serves as an insurance mechanism against
entry into poverty. Recent papers examine the interactions between leaving home
and entry into poverty, that is, how far poverty entry is the result of leaving home,
rather than arising from heterogeneity or selection Aasve, et al (2002).23
22 However, current income does not necessarily predict potential earnings. Researchers
typically model the relationship between predicted wages and living arrangements (Cobb-
Clark, 2008 p. 17).
23 Also, there are studies related to the wellbeing and feelings of parents while they live
with their adult children and reports on higher marital satisfaction after children have left
the nest Aquilino and Supple (1991).
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3.3 Theoretical model
Models of co-residence with parents involve a theoretical framework in which the
sons compare their utility living with parents and their expected utilities outside
the home. However, in case of co residence parents and children share income, as
well as housing and domestic goods. Thus their final optimal choice would also
depend on respectively parents and children utility levels in the outside option, i.e.,
the case of separate living arrangements Chiuri and Del Boca (2008). This section
is based on Manacorda and Moretti (2005) children’s housing arrangement model.24
3.3.1 Assumptions
For simplicity, consider a single surviving parent who has only one child. First,
assume that parent derive some utility from cohabiting with their son while the son
value their independence. Second, parent can transfer money to their sons in order
to provide an incentive for them to stay at home, also, we assume that parent are
selfish and possess all the bargaining power, so the parent appropriate the whole
surplus if they get their children to cooperate. Third, the parent offers an income
transfer to his child but only if he decides to live in a home; in other words, parents
are not altruistic if the child decides to leave home.
Finally, we assume a Stone–Geary utility function, this function offers a convincing
argument that the consumer’s optimal behavior for allocation of his budged takes
places only after he secures the minimum necessary amount of each good (Chung,
1994 p. 29). Hence, the system is characterized by the marginal budget–share and
subsistence level parameters.25
24 The motivation of the model is not specifying a structural equation to be estimated, the
submission is to illustrate the implication of different assumptions to contextualize the
results.
25 The expenditure system conforms to certain conditions. The first condition is additivity
separable function of the form U(x1,x2,…,xn) and can be represented, after a monotonic
transformation, as the sum of a set of partial utilities functions, hence, the sum of
expenditures or individual goods must equal the total expenditure. The second condition is
homogeneity in prices and total expenditure: the sum of income and price elasticities
equals zero (Chung, 1994 p. 28). The third condition is regularity, which implies quasi
concavity of the utility function Chang and Fawson (1994).
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3.3.2 Children utility function
We assume that children’s utility is a function of consumption (Cc) and (ac) term
representing the disutility of living at home (with 0 < ac <1). The child’s problem
can be written as:
Maximize Uc(Cc,H) = log (Cc) + H log (ac) (1)
subject to
Yc + b1H = Cc + R(1–H) (2)
Equation (2) represents the children budget constraint. Their resources are a
function of their income (Yc), and the compensation they receive from their parents
if living at home (b1). In the right hand side of the equation, the first term (Cc) is
the child consumption and (R) their housing cost they will have to pay if living on
their own, it can be observe if H=0. In other words, we assume that housing cost is
borne by children if they live away from home and by parents if children cohabit.
3.3.3 Parent’s utility function
The parent’s problem can be written as:
Maximize Up(Cp,H) = log (Cp) + H log (ap) (3)
subject to
Yp = Cp + b1H (4)
In equation (3), parent’s maximize consumption (Cp), and (ap) represents the
happiness of cohabitation with their son (with ap  1), The coefficient (H) describe
the parent and child preference for shared living, 0,1, hence, H=1 if the child is
living at home, H=0 otherwise. Equation (4), the father’s has an amount (Yp) of
income to spend in consumption (Cp) and any transfer to their child (H), the
parameter (b1)(0,1) is the transfer to cohabiting children.
Hence, father’s and children’s consumption can be expressed as:
0Hif
1Hif




pp
1pp
p YC
bYCC (5)
0Hif
1Hif



 RYC
bYCC
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1cc
c (6)
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3.3.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, parents set )( 1b to make children indifferent between living with
them or living on their own:
Uc(Yc + b1, 1) = Uc(Yc – R, 0) (7)
Replacing children’s utility function and solving by )( 1b , the optimal transfer is:
-)(1 c
c
c Ya
RYb  (8)
Conditional on )( 1b , parents are willing to bride their children into staying at
home if the utility they derive from cohabitation is higher than the utility from
living on their own.
)0,()1,( 1 pppp YUbYU   (9)
Replacing father’s utility function and solving by Yp, we have.
)1( 1

 ba
aY
p
p
p (10)
Replacing equation (9) on (10).
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In equilibrium:
P(H=1)=Pr(Yp  A1Yc – A2R) (12)
The model predicts that if cohabitation is a good for parents and bad for children.
From equation (12) in equilibrium the propensity of children to live with their
parents depends directly on parent’s income (Yp) and inversely on their income
(Yc) and any housing cost they will have to pay if living on their own (R).
Conditional to children’s income and outside housing cost, an increase on parent’s
income is associated with a rise in cohabitation rates (Manacorda and Moretti
2005, p. 806)
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3.4 Data and descriptive statistics
3.4.1 Data sources
The dataset used comes from 2011 EMOVI (Social Mobility Survey in Mexico,
EMOVI for its acronym in Spanish). 2011 EMOVI contains nationally
representative samples over a long two generations. It collects a wide range of the
data for individuals aged 25 to 64 years. Different to previous surveys in Mexico,
2011 EMOVI is a retrospective data that allows us to connect current respondent’s
information and their comparable retrospective data from parent’s and family
conditions when the interviewee’s was 14 years old. This allows us to recover data
for cohabiting and non-cohabiting children.
We determine whether they “co reside” or live “independently” based on whether
they consider any of the adults in their household a parental figure, and on whether
they consider themselves to be living independently or not. Although 2011 EMOVI
data is well suited to this research, there are also some limitations. First, there is
no retrospective information about the individuals who left the parental home prior
to the first wave; and we do not know at what time they left, so we cannot
associate time variables of these individuals and the interviewee. Second, other
important variable is the birth order of the sons, there is substantial literature
showing that birth order is a relevant precondition of social mobility; however, this
variable is not available. Third, information on parental income is not available;
however, parent’s education and household conditions are a good proxy for
permanent income.
The analysis is limited to millennia’s generation cohort (1980–1999). In total, there
are 5,192 individuals aged 25–35 years in the sample. Other conveniences in this
sample are the follow: More old individuals stay in home to care of their parents in
old age Reher (1998), and children less than 25 years live with parents in
successfully completing their education and entering the labor market.
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3.4.2 Descriptive statistics
An overview of residence between sons and parent’s is explored in Table 1. As can
be seen, the majority of sons lived with both parents at the age of 14 years, about
86 percent, in second place; about 11 percent lived with his mother. Regarding the
first group, we note that 49 percent still share a home with their parents, 37
percent with both parents, 4 percent with father, and 8 percent with mother.
About 51 percent of respondents no longer live with their parents.
Table 1. Sons currently living with their parent’s
Co–residence in the
original household
Sons currently living with their parent’s
TotalWith both
parent's
With
father’s
With
mother’s
Don't co
reside
With both parent's 1,679 172 337 2,294 4,482
(37%) (4%) (8%) (51%) (100%)
With father’s 6 53 1 48 108
(6%) (49%) (1%) (44%) (100%)
With mother’s 14 10 290 288 602
(2%) (2%) (48%) (48%) (100%)
Total 1,699 235 628 2,630 5,192
(33%) (5%) (12%) (51%) (100%)
Note: Only includes children living with both parents at the age of 14 years.
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
Table A1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample. Around 33 percent of them
currently live with both parents and 49 percent currently live with some parent’s.
Fourth percent of the sample are female, average age is around 28 years, and
educational attainment is around 9.90 years of completed schooling, 28 percent are
married and around 49 percent have sons. In relation to the siblings, 32 percent are
currently living at home and around 59 of them live away from home.
In the case of parent’s characteristics, father’s and mother’s age are about 55.9 and
53.18 years, and educational attainment is about 5.10 and 5.13 completed years
schooling, respectively. Household size is also shown, average household includes
about 5.1 members, and 51 percent of households are overcrowded.26
26 The most common measure of overcrowding is persons per room. We define
overcrowding household if currently live 2.5 or more habitants per bedroom.
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Graph 1 illustrates co residence with parents for both sexes by age. It is observed
a higher percentage of men living with their parents for all ages. This relationship
is inversely correlated with age, especially for sons between 25 and 33 years old.
However, this trend changed after 34 years, this advice than older individuals stay
in home to care of their parents in old age, as suggest Reher (1998).
Graph 1. Co residence with parent’s by age
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
Table 2 summarizes group averages and provides the p-values of a hypothesis test,
testing against the null hypothesis that the two groups have equal means of the
particular observation. Similar rates of co residence are observed for both sexes in
some characteristics. The average age for those living with their parents, and those
who do not live with their parents are about 27 years and 29 years, respectively.
We also observe significant differences in marital status; married children have less
residing with their parents.
An important difference between the sexes is observed in employment. While for
women is a similar percentage in both categories. Men have higher labor
participation; this participation is even greater for men who do not live with their
parents. It is also observed that children with higher education attainment have
higher rates of co residence. A possibility is that differences may be attributable
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because parents support their children to keep studying. However, simply looking
at differences in schooling cannot draw conclusions, but rather regression analysis is
required to find the effect of co residence.
In relation to the siblings, it is found that rates of co residence maintain a similar
brother’s preferences behavior. In other words, having siblings in the home is
associated with high rates of co-residence. On the other hand, as a generation
conforms to more siblings, children tend to live away from home.
Table 2. Co residence with parents by sex
Variable
Female (n=2,056) Male (n=1,136)
Living
(n=662)
Non
living
(n=1,394)
Mean Diff Living(n=1,900)
Non
living
(n=1,236)
Mean Diff
Age 27.511 29.242 -1.731*** 27.184 29.439 -2.255***
Married 0.094 0.459 -0.365*** 0.090 0.464 -0.374***
1 if has sons 0.329 0.852 -0.523*** 0.156 0.675 -0.519***
1 if employment 0.409 0.405 -0.005 0.614 0.807 -0.194***
Less than primary 0.060 0.081 -0.021* 0.051 0.075 -0.025***
Primary completed 0.127 0.216 -0.089*** 0.147 0.199 -0.052***
Secondary completed 0.702 0.647 0.055** 0.683 0.644 0.039**
University completed 0.110 0.056 0.054*** 0.120 0.082 0.038***
Number of siblings 1.977 3.030 -1.053*** 1.868 2.716 -0.848***
1 if siblings living at home 0.387 0.838 -0.451*** 0.351 0.805 -0.454***
1 if siblings living away home 0.538 0.052 0.485*** 0.589 0.093 0.496***
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
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3.5 Methodology
3.5.1 Probit model
In our empirical analysis, we compare the utility of children living with their
parents (U1) and non living with their parents (U0). More formally, suppose that
the underlying latent variable ìy reflects the propensity of the individual to live
with their parents, and is a linear function of a vector of variables xi, with
coefficient vector β. In this model we use currently individual data –schooling
attainment, employment, sex, marital status–, retrospective information about
parents’ characteristics, and data at regional and country level to describe the
environment adult children face. The utilities for individual i are defined by
,, 11'000'1 iiìiiì εβxUεβxU  (13)
Where iε an unobserved individual–specific component and xi is is vectors of
variables determining the decision to co reside with their parents. The alternative
with maximal utility is chosen, so that
parentstheirwithlivingnon:UUif0
parentstheirwithliving:UUif1
10
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
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ii
iy (14)
In this case the choice depends on the differences in the utilities iiii εβx  '01 UU ,
where 01 - βββ  and iii εεε 01  . Again, if the individual specific term iε are
assumed to be independent and identically distributed with symmetric density f, it
follows that
)(]P[]P[1]P[ ''' βxFβxεβxεy iiiiii  (15)
Where F is the cumulative distribution of iε . Assuming that F is differentiable
with derivative f (the standard normal density function corresponding to F), the
marginal effect of the j th explanatory variable is given by
kjββxfx
y
i
ji
i ,...,2,)(1]P[ j' 
 (16)
This shows that the marginal effect of changes in the explanatory variables
depends on the level of these variables.
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3.5.2 Empirical results
Table 3 and 4 reports average marginal effect of estimates of probit models for the
probability of living with their parents. We estimate separately each of the
equations for females (Table 3) and males (Table 4) to reflect differences by
gender. As previously stated, the socio economic variables allow us to identify the
parameter of interest, in particular, if the child performs economic activity, and
educational achievements, the set of controls included are marital status and if the
respondent has children.
In Model 1 (Column 1) for both sexes, we estimate the impact of schooling.
Surprisingly to the results in other papers, we do not find evidence of the effect of
schooling of children on the propensity to co reside with their parents. This result
is still maintained for the different specifications. Contrary as we expect, the effect
of education attained on the propensity to remain living with parents is absent.
In relations to employment rate, we found that working reduce the propensity to co
residence with parents only for male sample, this is explained in part by labor
participation –female employment rate is only 40% as opposed to 80% for males–
for children not living with their parents. This results is similar to previous papers
that suggest women’s labor force participation, more than men’s, is affected by
family composition. (Connelly, et al., p. 2). In addition, research on women’s labor
force participation has often found that the need to care for children reduces
women’s labor market employment. However, these coefficients should be
considered with caution due to the possible endogeneity between labor
participation and co residence. There could be unobservable factors related to
stronger preferences for working as opposed to co residence with parents. On the
contrary, it could be also that components of the error term reflect high
propensities to work inducing a positive correlation (Crespo, 2008 p. 12).27
27 Hence, resulting marginal effect of the co residence variable can be interpreted as the
exogenous portion of the effect, while the marginal effect of the residual can be interpreted
as a measure of the relationship of the unobserved characteristics correlated with the
choice to co residence and participation in the labor markets (Connelly, 2014 p. 14). IV
procedure could be the follow: the first stage is a reduced form co residence equation, while
the second stage is a labor force participation equation, which includes both co residence
with adult children and the residuals of the co residence equation as independent variable.
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Also, we found that age is significant in most equations, as we expect we found a
positive relationship between the leaving parent’s household and aging of the
children, these results are largely consistent with Flatau et al., (2003) who also find
a gradual rise in the age at which those under the age of 30 are leaving home. The
positive sign of the quadratic term suggests that for the final years as the
generational court, children have to observe inferior rates of co residence with their
parents. In Graph A1 we report the predicted probabilities to living parent’s
house by age.
The other variable of interest is the effect of co residing observed in siblings. In
column (2) dummies variables are included to capture this dimension. In this case,
the coefficients suggest that having brothers away from home and living at home is
associated with households where the brothers have similar preferences of co
residence. However, since in the database is not possible to determine the birth
order, we cannot associate preferences to leave the parental home between older
siblings to younger siblings or vice versa.
In columns (3), (4) and (5) controls for parent’s education and occupation are
added (proxies for permanent income). In households where mothers have a higher
education it is less likely that adult children co reside. This interpretation here is
twofold: in higher educated households potentially greater resources are available to
the household which allow children to move out earlier. In relation to father’s
schooling, the effect is not significant.
Hence, the working status of parents, especially the mother’s one, appears to be the
most important factor, robust coefficients show a positive relationship in the
departure of the children home. There might be several explanations supporting
this view. On one hand a working mother reduces the amount of goods and services
produced in the household, rendering less appealing living with parents; on the
other, her status increases the household income, providing a better insurance to all
members. In this respect, the coefficient can also be interpreted as a proxy for
family culture of women’s independence which coherently is greater for woman
than for man.
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In addition, mother’s working status can also be interpreted as a proxy for family
attitude towards women independence Chiuri and Del Boca (2008). Similary, Diaz
and Guillo (2005) found that children living in household where both parents are
working may experience low unemployment rates, which is associated with
independence of children at a younger age. 28
Finally, some of the contextual variables do affect individual co residential rates,
such as, home owners, housing cost and overcrowded home, these variables do not
have effect.
28 In McElroy (1985) theoretical model the reservation wage of young adults who live with
their parents, and their utility as a member of their parent’s household, decrease with their
mother’s wage. Therefore, as their mother’s wages increase, their probability of moving out
increases as well
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Table 3. Average marginal effect for female sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 if employment -0.0227 -0.00366 -0.00382 -0.00482 -0.00508
(-0.947) (-0.142) (-0.148) (-0.186) (-0.197)
Years of schooling 0.00767* 0.00707 0.00514 0.00124 0.00117
(2.210) (1.900) (1.306) (0.308) (0.288)
Age -0.237** -0.191* -0.184* -0.213** -0.208**
(-3.233) (-2.446) (-2.360) (-2.724) (-2.655)
Age square 0.00385** 0.00304* 0.00294* 0.00344** 0.00335*
(3.090) (2.300) (2.220) (2.591) (2.524)
1 if married -0.272*** -0.211*** -0.208*** -0.215*** -0.212***
(-9.790) (-7.101) (-7.043) (-7.219) (-7.120)
1 if have children -0.328*** -0.200*** -0.192*** -0.195*** -0.193***
(-8.897) (-5.091) (-4.905) (-4.970) (-4.913)
Number of children -0.0358* -0.0200 -0.0190 -0.0210 -0.0212
(-2.278) (-1.224) (-1.166) (-1.286) (-1.299)
1 if has siblings living in home 0.436*** 0.435*** 0.429*** 0.426***
(10.588) (10.578) (10.420) (10.376)
1 if has siblings living away home -0.143** -0.155** -0.157** -0.162**
(-2.666) (-2.872) (-2.903) (-3.016)
1 if father used to work 0.00221 0.0293
(0.070) (0.896)
Father's years of schooling 0.00383 -0.00303
(1.221) (-0.759)
1 if mother used to work 0.0947*** 0.0970**
(3.312) (3.265)
Mother's years of schooling 0.0115*** 0.0134**
(3.360) (3.068)
Number of siblings YES YES YES YES YES
Father’s with some disabilities YES YES YES YES YES
Father’s indigenous condition YES YES YES YES YES
Household socioeconomic index YES YES YES YES YES
1 if they were home owners YES YES YES YES YES
1 if overcrowded home YES YES YES YES YES
Housing cost YES YES YES YES YES
Dummies: locality size, state YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,056 2,056 2,049 2,048 2,042
Log lik. -904.9 -761.4 -754.3 -738.1 -732.7
McFadden's R2 0.300 0.411 0.413 0.425 0.426
Count R 81.96% 85.56% 85.60% 85.60% 85.80%
Notes. Marginal effects, parentheses contain the mean of the estimated standard errors.
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
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Table 4. Average marginal effect for male sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 if employment -0.109*** -0.0847*** -0.0827*** -0.0828*** -0.0818**
(-4.650) (-3.452) (-3.340) (-3.346) (-3.278)
Years of schooling 0.00568 0.00528 0.00375 0.00253 0.00251
(1.942) (1.749) (1.148) (0.777) (0.754)
Age -0.230*** -0.221** -0.223** -0.222** -0.223**
(-3.390) (-3.147) (-3.164) (-3.137) (-3.148)
Age square 0.00343** 0.00337** 0.00341** 0.00338** 0.00341**
(2.968) (2.819) (2.842) (2.819) (2.832)
1 if married -0.281*** -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.209*** -0.206***
(-10.708) (-7.613) (-7.552) (-7.679) (-7.529)
1 if have children -0.286*** -0.153*** -0.159*** -0.150*** -0.155***
(-7.722) (-3.944) (-4.076) (-3.844) (-3.946)
Number of children -0.0640*** -0.0567** -0.0564** -0.0566** -0.0567**
(-3.489) (-2.975) (-2.941) (-2.958) (-2.950)
1 if has siblings living in home 0.408*** 0.408*** 0.406*** 0.408***
(11.908) (11.831) (11.812) (11.794)
1 if has siblings living away home -0.129** -0.131** -0.130** -0.133**
(-3.112) (-3.138) (-3.123) (-3.186)
1 if father used to work 0.0283 0.0374
(0.949) (1.220)
Father's years of schooling 0.00321 -0.00234
(1.170) (-0.662)
1 if mother used to work -0.00584** 0.00182**
(-0.212) (0.064)
Mother's years of schooling 0.00781** 0.00972*
(2.644) (2.538)
Number of siblings YES YES YES YES YES
Father’s with some disabilities YES YES YES YES YES
Father’s indigenous condition YES YES YES YES YES
Household socioeconomic index YES YES YES YES YES
1 if they were home owners YES YES YES YES YES
1 if overcrowded home YES YES YES YES YES
Housing cost YES YES YES YES YES
Dummies: locality size, state YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,136 3,136 3,126 3,122 3,114
Log lik. -1,466.0 -1,273.9 -1,266.8 -1,265.2 -1,258.3
McFadden's R2 0.303 0.394 0.396 0.396 0.398
Count R 79.34% 83.29% 83.43% 83.47% 83.46%
Notes. Marginal effects, parentheses contain the mean of the estimated standard errors.
*: p < 0.10, **: <0.05, ***: p<0.01
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI.
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3.6 Conclusions
This paper adds to the literature by examining the determinants of children’s
propensity to live with their parents. Why young adults co-residence with her
parents beyond mature age has several issue. i.e., living with parent’s serves as an
important mechanism through with parents transfer resources to their adult’s sons.
We focus on Millennia’s Generation (1980–1999) in order to consider some relevant
characteristics’ in this generation such as more educational outcomes than previous
generations, however, economic achievements may have affected due to episodes of
economic crisis–.
Based on Manacorda and Moretti (2005) I develop a theoretical model to illustrate
children’s and parents living arrangements. Conditional to children’s income and
outside housing cost, an increase on parent’s income is associated with a rise in
cohabitation rates.
Regarding the empirical results, comparing utility levels for sons living with their
parent’s and non living I found that labor participation reduce the propensity to co
residence only for males, this is explained in part by lower labor participation for
female sample, however, this results should be considered with caution due to
endogeneity between labor participation and co residence. Surprisingly to the
results in other papers, the effect of education attained on the propensity to remain
living with parents is absent.
In addition, controlling by working status and schooling of parent’s we found that
mother’s appears to be the most important. There might be several explanations
supporting this view. On one hand a working mother reduces the amount of goods
and services produced in the household, rendering less appealing living with
parents; on the other, her status increases the household income, providing a better
insurance to all members. Similar to other papers, we found that children living in
household where both parents are working may experience low unemployment
rates, which is associated with independence of children at younger age.
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5 Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Min Max Mean SD N
1 if living with both parent’s 0 1 0.33 0.47 5,192
1 if living with some parent’s 0 1 0.49 0.50 5,192
1 if living only with father’s 0 1 0.37 0.48 5,192
1 if living only with mother’s 0 1 0.45 0.50 5,192
1 if female 0 1 0.40 0.49 5,192
1 if employed 0 1 0.57 0.49 5,192
Age 25 35 28.32 3.13 5,192
Age squared 625 1,225 811.55 184.43 5,192
Completed years schooling 0 26 9.90 3.62 5,192
1 if married 0 1 0.28 0.45 5,192
1 if have sons 0 1 0.49 0.50 5,192
Number of sons 0 7 0.92 1.18 5,192
1 if have siblings 0 1 0.82 0.38 5,192
Number of siblings 0 14 2.40 2.22 5,192
1 if siblings living away home 0 1 0.59 0.49 5,192
1 if siblings living at home 0 1 0.32 0.47 5,192
1 if father's household head 0 1 0.85 0.36 5,192
Father’s currently age 35 100 55.91 9.04 4,351
1 if father used to work 0 1 0.82 0.38 5,192
Father’s completed years schooling 0 25 5.10 4.52 5,192
1 if father’s indigenous 0 1 0.13 0.33 5,192
1 if father’s with some disabilities 0 1 0.00 0.06 5,192
Mother’s currently age 31 97 53.18 8.20 4,611
1 if mother used to work 0 1 0.21 0.41 5,192
Mother’s completed years schooling 0 24 5.13 4.21 5,192
1 if mother’s indigenous 0 1 0.12 0.33 5,192
1 if mothers with some disabilities 0 1 0.00 0.06 5,192
1 if they are home owners 0 1 0.64 0.48 5,192
Number of people living in home 1 22 5.14 2.05 5,192
1 if overcrowded housing 0 1 0.51 0.50 5,192
Housing costs 363 6,750 1,875 912 5,192
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
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Graph A1. Predicted probabilities to living with some parent’s by sex
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
Graph A2. Predicted probabilities to living with both parent’s by sex
Notes. Only include children with both parent’s alive.
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2011 EMOVI
87
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Pr
(L
iv
in
g 
w
ith
 s
om
e 
pa
re
nt
's
=1
)
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
Age
Female=0, Married=0 Female=0, Married=1
Female=1, Married=0 Female=1, Married=1
Graph A3. Predicted probabilities to living with parent’s by marital status
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